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On April 17, 1982, on the lawn of Ottawa's Parliament Hill,
Queen Elizabeth II proclaimed into force Canada's constitution.'
Her action not only ended the United Kingdom's role in Canada's
legal system by patriating constitutional amendment, but also en-
trenched an evidentiary exclusionary clause for certain violations of
its guaranteed rights and freedoms. The Constitution Act, 19822
has substantially affected Canada's system of constitutional govern-
ment,3 including a modification of the previous doctrine of Parlia-
mentary supremacy.4 Most important for this Article, however, is
section 24 which entrenches as the supreme law of Canada remedies
for the violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties;
among the remedies, is excluding evidence in court.
While Canada was embracing an evidentiary exclusionary rule
as its constitutional remedy, the similar rule in the United States was
being questioned by the judiciary, legislature and public. This
* Assistant Crown Attorney, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Ottawa, Can-
ada. LL.M., Cornell University, 1985; LL.B., Queen's University, 1973; B.A. (Hons.),
University of Toronto, 1970.
1 See Montgomery, A New Constitution, A Grand Occasion, Globe & Mail (Toronto),
April 19, 1982, at I.
2 Enacted by the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (1982). See also infra note 49.
3 A number of rights and liberties concerning language, education, equality, expres-
sion, mobility and the criminal process were guaranteed for the first time by a written
constitution. Sections 52 and 24 secure judicial review and therefore give the judiciary a
new role in defining the nature and extent of Canadian civil rights. This judicial role is
qualified, however, by section 33 which allows Parliament or a provincial legislature to
override the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
4 Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 52 (1982).
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debate was primarily a reaction to the phenomenal judicial expan-
sion of constitutional rights under the Warren Court.5 The expan-
sion of the exclusionary rule was the most visible product and
therefore caused a concerned reexamination of the constitutional
and remedial effects flowing from the violation of those constitu-
tional rights. Perhaps no American legal doctrine has raised pas-
sions to such a height as the exclusionary rule.
This debate centers mostly on the inadequacies of either the
exclusionary rule or the alternatives to it. Adequacy of the remedy,
however, is not the only issue. Also important are the availability
and accessibility of remedies for the citizen whose rights are vio-
lated, the nature of those remedies, and their justifiability.
The introduction of the constitutional Charter of Rights has
clearly brought Canada closer to American law, so not surprisingly
Canadian judges are citing American authorities more frequently. 6
Thus, the current American reanalysis should not only illuminate a
number of legal and public concerns, but also provide insight for
the Canadian initiative.
This Article focuses on the remedies available upon the viola-
tion of a constitutional right rather than the scope of those rights.
Therefore, it does not analyze the way in which these rights have
been interpreted by the courts although that is admittedly an impor-
tant factor in the development of remedies. 7 Furthermore, this is
not an analysis of the means by which an individual might seek
redress. 8
After noting the constitutional development and general nature
of protecting rights in both Canada and the United States, this Arti-
cle examines the exclusionary rule. In the United States other reme-
dies-torts, injunctions and criminal sanctions-are considered
alternatives to the exclusionary rule for providing protection of con-
stitutional rights; therefore, they also are surveyed. Finally, this Ar-
ticle considers the functional operation of the components of each
country's legal system.
5 See Editors of The Criminal Law Reporter, The Criminal Law Revolution and Its Af-
termath: 1960-1974 (1975).
6 M. FRIEDLAND, A CENTURY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF CANADIAN LAW 205-06 (1984).
7 A number of comparisons of American and Canadian rights have appeared. See
THE U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (W.
McKercher ed. 1983); Sedler, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in Canada: The
Impact of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1191, 1211-
27 (1984).
8 See L. HURwrrz, THE STATE AS DEFENDANT: GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
THE REDRESS OF INDIVIDUAL GRIEVANCES (1981).
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Canadian and American constitutional law developed quite dif-
ferently despite having a common English background. This dis-
similarity is a product partly of timing and partly of the manner in
which each country came to be independent.
In the United States a unilateral Declaration of Independence
documented the revolutionary political break from Great Britain.9
The original Constitution of the United States had few provisions
dealing with the criminal process,' 0 but the first ten amendments
introduced some fifteen separate rights specific to the criminal jus-
tice process. The fourth amendment proclaims that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... "I'
Grand jury procedure for a "capital, or other infamous crime" is
required by the fifth amendment, which also prohibits a person from
being tried twice for the same crime or being compelled "to be a
witness against himself."' 12 The sixth amendment lists trial rights
such as a "speedy and public trial," "impartial jury" and the "Assist-
ance of Counsel for this defence."' 13 The eighth amendment pro-
hibits "[e]xcessive bail," the imposition of "excessive fines" and the
infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments."' 14 Along with these
specific guarantees, the fifth amendment requires the criminal jus-
tice system to use due process.' 5 The judiciary has constructed a
network of procedural safeguards around the fifth and, later, the
fourteenth amendments. 16
One aspect of American constitutional rights history that differs
from Canada's is the process of incorporating federal constitutional
control over state procedures. 17 Until 1868, the courts applied the
9 The unmanageable Articles of Confederation (1781) soon were remodelled into a
Constitution, which was ratified by the thirteen uniting states in 1789. As part of the
ratification agreement, ten amendments (referred to as the Bill of Rights) were added in
1791, and these became the basis for most civil liberties. In 1868, after the Civil War
(1861-65), the fourteenth amendment established federal due process control over cer-
tain state practices and has become another source of civil liberties.
10 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; art. III, § 2; art. III, § 3; art. IV, § 2.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." Id.
16 See 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.4-.9 (1984 & Supp. 1984).
17 See I W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at §§ 1.5(b), 2.2-.6; SchlueterJudicial
Federalism and Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59
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rights of the first ten amendments solely to the federal govern-
ment.18 Yet an estimated 97% of criminal prosecutions involve
state, not federal, law. 19 The incorporation of the various rights
into state procedures, a result of the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, has had an impact on the scope of those rights and on
the remedies available from the court.20 Now only two protections
of the ten amendments do not apply to the states: the necessity of a
grand jury indictment for initiating criminal prosecutions 2x and the
prohibition of excessive bail.2 2 Although the primary source of indi-
vidual rights traditionally has been the federal Constitution, a state
may provide through its own constitution a basis for more expansive
rights and liberties and afford greater protection than provided fed-
erally. The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to protect against arbi-
trary and discriminatory use of political power, and the fourteenth
amendment has been used to apply that theory to state
governments.
In 1867, the British North American colonies adopted the idea
of a federal union, as had the United States, but the form taken at
both the provincial and central federal level was the British model of
parliamentary government. Canadian independence from Britain
came more gradually than that of the United States and culminated
in the original confederation of four provinces by a British statute,
the British North America Act, 1867 (now the Constitution Act,
1867).23 The primary concern of the Constitution Act, 1867, was
the division of legislative power between the central and provincial
governments; individual rights were not addressed by the Act. Like
the British tradition, the Canadian system accorded special constitu-
tional deference to certain legislation and common law precepts and
customs. The preamble to the British North America Act, 1867, as-
serts the desire that the new confederation have "a Constitution
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1079 (1984); Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship Between
State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1118
(1984); Wisdom, Foreward: The Ever-Whirling Wheels of American Federalism, 59 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 1063, 1076-78 (1984).
18 See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
19 See I W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, § 1.2 n.2, at 3.
20 There is also a whole body of prior state law experience which is still applicable to
state constitutional interpretation.
21 U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
23 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3. It was renamed the Consti-
tution Act, 1867, by the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, Sched. B, § 50 (1982). Four prov-




similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom."' 24 Although the
judiciary has always had limited power to define and review federal
and provincial legislative ability, the foundation of individual rights
remained primarily negative in the sense that actions were allowed
until they violated some ordinary law of the land.
Power over criminal law and procedure is held by the federal
government, which makes criminal law uniform throughout Can-
ada.25 Provinces have jurisdiction over the administration of jus-
tice,26 meaning the organization of courts and the prosecution of
crimes. Before 1982, Canada's general public law and constitution
were primarily products of the British model.27 Until that time,
courts had no basis to override otherwise valid governmental ac-
tions because individual rights were not entrenched (although re-
stricted judicial review was available) .28
Three issues remained as major constitutional controversies:
the highest judicial authority, the amendment of Canada's indepen-
dence statute, and the partnership of French Canada. Appeals from
the final courts in Canada continued to go to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in London until December 23, 1949. Amend-
ment of Canada's constitution (patriation) finally was abrogated
completely by Britain on April 17, 1982.29 The third issue probably
will remain forever.
The Canadian government had been concerned for some time
about the absence of an amending formula. The government also
wanted to make French and English language rights uniform across
the country. Therefore, the goals of a written constitution were to
transfer the amending power from the United Kingdom to Canada
and at the same time attempt to nationalize bilingualism and its at-
24 Constitution Act, 1867, at preamble. For a discussion of constitutional rights in
the United Kingdom, see Leigh, The Protection of the Rights of the Accused in Pre-Trial Proce-
dure: England and Wales and Lidstone, Human Rights in the English Criminal Trial, both in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-A COMPARATIVE STUDY (J. Andrews ed. 1982).
25 Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(27).
26 Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(14). Historically, provincial Attorneys General have
prosecuted offences under the Criminal Code of Canada, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34
(1970), even though the Attorney General of Canada has theoretical status to prosecute
in provincial courts.
27 See W. LEDERMAN, CONTINUING CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS 47-62
(1981).
28 In 1960, Parliament attempted to establish written rights by the Canadian Bill of
Rights, CAN. REV. STAT. App. III (1970). This was an ordinary federal statute that even-
tually was interpreted narrowly by overriding inconsistent federal statutes by making
them inoperative.
29 Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 2 (1982).
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tendant necessities. The Canada Act 1982 accomplished the former
and made inroads towards the latter objective.
Canada's new constitutional rights are qualified in two impor-
tant respects. First, section 1 imposes "reasonable limits" on its
rights and freedoms and declares that they are not absolute. 30
Thus, Canada has provided textual and structural guidance for the
courts in their examination of restrictions that implicate constitu-
tional rights. For instance, there are permissible restrictions on ex-
pression3' that are clearer than the absolute terms of the American
first amendment. Second, as a result of a last minute compromise
between the federal and provincial governments on the agreement
for a Charter of Rights (representing "the quintessential Canadian
compromise" 32), an override or non obstante clause was added:
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly de-
clare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be,
that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a pro-
vision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declara-
tion made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it
would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the
declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have
effect five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may
be specified in the declaration.
(4) Parliament or a legislature of a province may reenact a decla-
ration made under subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made
under subsection (4).33
This "legislative review of judicial review" 34 allows the federal
or a provincial government to make a political decision to avoid fric-
tion with the judiciary. Parliamentary sovereignty thus is accommo-
dated in the constitution. Subject to those two important
provisions, Canada has provided a number of rights and freedoms.
30 "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." Constitution Act, 1982, § 1.
31 Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the
press and other media of communication;(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.
Constitution Act, 1982, § 2.
32 Russell, The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian Courts, 25
CAN. PUB. AD. 1, 32 (1982).
33 Constitution Act, 1982, § 33.
34 Russell, supra note 32, at 30.
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Under the heading "Fundamental Freedoms," section 2 enumerates
freedoms of religion, expression, peaceful assembly and association.
"Democratic Rights" are described in sections 3 through 5 and in-
clude the right to vote and the length of Parliamentary sessions.
Section 6 covers "Mobility Rights" for residence and work.
The rights most pertinent to the criminal justice system are
those classified as "Legal Rights." 35 Section 7 affirms the "right to
life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be de-
prived thereof except in accordance with the principles of funda-
mental justice."'3 6 Section 8 asserts "the right to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure"3 7 and section 9 "the right not to be
arbitrarily detained or imprisoned."3 8 "Arrest or detention" rights
of being "informed promptly of the reasons therefor," of retaining
and instructing "counsel without delay and [being] informed of that
right" and of the applicability of habeas corpus are included in Section
10.39 Section 11 lists a number of rights involved in criminal and
penal matters for the person charged with an offence, including be-
ing "tried within a reasonable time," not being "compelled to be a
witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence"
and being "presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law
in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal." 40
Litigation concerning the nature and scope of these rights will
continue to illuminate their content. Analytical theories, perhaps
similar to the privacy-interest doctrine used to interpret the fourth
35 Constitution Act, 1982, §§ 7-14.
36 "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
Constitution Act, 1982, § 7.
37 "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure."
Constitution Act, 1982, § 8.
38 "Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned." Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, § 9.
39 Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right;
and
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to
be released if the detention is not lawful.
Constitution Act, 1982, § 10.
40 Any person charged with an offence has the right
(a) to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence;
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time;
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in re-
spect of the offence;
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.
Constitution Act, 1982, § 1 (a)-(d).
614 [Vol. 76
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
amendment in the United States, will affect the courts' interpreta-
tion of these rights.4'
What was the impetus in 1982 for entrenching criminal process
rights into the constitution? Unlike the American colonies of the
mid-1700's, Canada was facing neither outside oppression nor an
internal concern for control of government excess or abuse. One
participant in the negotiating process stated that it was "a valid re-
sponse to a widely felt need."'42 In his view it "represented a bal-
ance between the dominant English and French legal traditions as
well as reflect[ed] the plurality of our country as a whole." 43
Although each province already had human rights legislation, the
drafters felt it was necessary to have a uniform law.
At the same time we did not look upon the Charter as an Ameri-
can Bill of Rights. It did not reflect a state created by revolution and
refined in the crucible of a long and bloody civil war. We were not
embracing the extensive regime of judicial review which exists under
the Constitution of the United States of America. 44
Although this explanation appears politically acceptable, the
reason for the federal individual rights was probably Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau's personal idealism and ambition, 45 along with the
complementary existence of civil and common law traditions in Can-
ada. Trudeau had argued for an entrenched bill of rights since his
earliest political position as Justice Minister and for him the minor-
ity language and education rights were the heart of the Charter. For
the remaining rights, the Charter is almost a theoretical and confir-
matory document.46 During the whole process of provincial-federal
negotiation and final unilateral action, there was no popular de-
mand for a declaration of criminal process rights.47 There was
growing awareness, however, of how important the constitution was
going to be to the legal fabric of the nation.
Something has now changed. Constitutional law is being recog-
nized as a continuing interaction of different, sometimes directly com-
peting social interests; constitutional law-making is becoming the
41 See Hunter v. Southam Inc., 11 D.L.R. 4th 641 (Can. 1984).
42 McMurtry, The Search for a Constitutional Accord-A Personal Memoir, 8 QUEEN'S L.J.
28, 58 (1982/83) (former Attorney General of Ontario).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See P. TRUDEAU, A CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS (1968); P. TRUDEAU, FEDERALISM
AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS (1977).
46 See the preamble to the Resolution respecting the Constitution of Canada
adopted by the House of Commons and Senate in December 1981, infra note 49.
47 See Russell, The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61
CAN. B. REV. 30 (1983). Even when the public came aroused after the November 5, 1981
accord, its interest centered on aboriginal and women's rights.
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resolution or synthesis of those conflicts. It is all rather American,
with the courts destined, as in the United States, to be at the heart of
the process, whether they like it or not.4 8
The first drafts of the unborn constitution contained no en-
forcement for breach of its provisions; it was an articulation of prin-
ciples but not of power.4 9 When later testimony before the Joint
Subcommittee pointed out the futility and possible confusion of en-
acting a constitution without entrenched remedies, the present form
of section 24 came into existence.
After failing to obtain unanimous support from the provinces,
the Canadian government asked the Parliament of the United King-
dom for a statute which would incorporate the new proposals as well
as previous constitutional statutes. 50 That Act, the Canada Act
1982, was hastily passed and its incorporated Schedule B, called the
Constitution Act, 1982 (although not an act of the Canadian Parlia-
ment) became the supreme law of Canada.5 1
Although Canada and the United States share a language and
have close social, economic and political ties, there are a number of
differences which affect an analysis of civil rights. Several important
aspects of Canada's constitutional development-responsible gov-
ernment in the 1840's (within the continued parliamentary frame-
work), federation in the 1860's (with a different conception of power
allocation), and a written constitution in the 1980's-as well as their
peaceful acquisition, contrast greatly with the American experience.
Both Canadian federal and provincial governments derive their
power from constitutional allocation, whereas in the United States
48 E. McWHINNEY, CANADA AND THE CONSTITUTION 1979-1982: PATRIATION AND THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS 112 (1982).
49 The legislative history of Canada's constitution is somewhat obscure. On October
2, 1980, the most modem of proposals was published by the Government of Canada as
"Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen respecting the
Constitution of Canada." The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of
Commons on the Constitution of Canada was formed to consider and report on the
"Proposed Resolution .... The "Proposed Resolution.. .", as it was later amended,
was adopted by the House of Commons (April 23, 1981) and the Senate (April 24,
1981). On November 5, 1981, a resolution was agreed to by the federal and provincial
representatives, except for Quebec, and as a result the "Proposed Resolution. . ." was
withdrawn and a new resolution was adopted by the House of Commons (December 2,
1981) and the Senate (December 8, 1981). This resolution was submitted to the United
Kingdom Parliament, which as a result passed the Canada Act 1982, which incorporated
as Schedule B the Constitution Act, 1982. The Canada Act received Royal assent on
March 29, 1982, and was proclaimed in force April 17, 1982. The first amendments
were made to the Constitution Act, 1982 on June 21, 1984. For an overview of the
political process, see E. McWHINNEY, supra note 48.
50 See G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS ch. XI (1984); Phillips, The Can-
ada Act 1982, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 845 (1982).
51 Constitution Act, 1982, § 52.
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the states have general sovereign power except where the Constitu-
tion confers onto the federal government. Canada's federal govern-
ment controls criminal law and procedure, thus eliminating the
need for the judiciary to impose uniformity, unlike the United States
where criminal law is primarily a state responsibility.52 In the
United States, the Supreme Court plays an important role in impos-
ing minimum standards on state institutions, while in Canada fed-
eral legislation does this directly.
The role of the judiciary in the constitutional process is also
different. In the United States the process is "structurally con-
frontational,"5 giving the federal judiciary ultimate responsibility
for establishing constitutional norms. Canada basically has a unitary
court system, in contrast to the American system of federal and state
courts with differentjurisdictions. The Federal Court of Canada has
limited jurisdiction over federal revenue, citizenship, patents and
federal agencies and this latter jurisdiction often includes constitu-
tional cases involving prisoners in federal institutions. The
Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court of appeal for all Ca-
nadian courts and can decide all questions of provincial and federal
law. In contrast, state law can reach only the particular state's high-
est state court, while the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court is preconditioned on a federal law question. "Thus, the di-
chotomy between questions of federal and state law" which is of
"such importance in the United States is . . . absent in Canada." 54
In addition, the Canadian judiciary has both an advisory and adjudi-
cative function. Constitutional questions may be brought to courts
by government references and this has been an important aspect of
constitutional interpretation in Canada. Unlike the United States,
judicial review in Canada does not necessarily result in supremacy
because the federal parliament or provincial legislature can specifi-
cally exempt legislation from the Charter's control.55
There ate other aspects of unknown influence on the constitu-
tional process. For instance, Canada's smaller population appar-
ently generates less crime and litigation both in the aggregate and
per capita. The smaller judiciary in Canada and the presence of
only ten provincial bodies makes uniformity of law somewhat less of
a problem. Furthermore, the clash between competing interests is
seemingly less intense in Canada, where the debate is less
politicized and is directed towards different constitutional concerns.
52 Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(27).
53 Sedler, supra note 7, at 1231.
54 See id. at 1200-01.
55 Constitution Act, 1982, § 33.
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Sensitivity to the separation of powers on both the federal-provin-
cial and the executive-legislature-judiciary level is not as strong in
Canada. In the United States, race and indigency have been seen as
major factors in civil rights development, while in Canada, lan-
guage, heritage and education are likely to provide that fulcrum.
C. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS
If a constitution is of ultimate legal importance to a nation, then
surely the violation of a constitutional right should result in a rem-
edy of equal dimension. Unfortunately, the distinction between
right and remedy is not always clear. To many in the United States,
the exclusionary rule, not the fourth amendment, is the prohibition
against illegal behavior by law enforcement officials. Although this
belief almost has become part of the legal culture, it is necessary to
separate right from remedy, because the latter depends on the theo-
retical basis of the rule. There is a tendency to focus on the scope of
the right or the definition of the liberty at the expense of addressing
pointedly the redress which should follow a violation. "Protection,"
although it is the word most used in reference to civil rights, raises
the question of what it means to "guarantee a right" or "protect a
right." If we mean protection against the government's legislative
power, then the remedy is judicial quashing of legislation or ruling
that it has no effect. Protection against the activity of government
agents may entail compensation to the aggrieved party, punishment
of the transgressor or his class of society, or legal nullification of the
results of the transgression. As ChiefJustice Holt astutely noted in
1703 when considering English fundamental rights: "[I]t is a vain
thing to imagine a right without a remedy." 56
The United States Constitution provides no explicit remedy or
redress for the violation of its rights. For the most part rights are
described and asserted by proscribing activity. In the Canadian con-
stitution the freedoms and rights are "guarantee[d]" 57 and sections
24 and 52 provide enforcement mechanisms. Section 52(1) explic-
itly provides for the court's right to review legislation and to invali-
date it.58 In the United States, the concept of judicial review was
56 Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (H.L. 1703).
57 Constitution Act, 1982, § 1.
58 (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect.
(2) The Constitution of Canada includes
(a) the Canada Act 1982. including this Act;
(b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and




developed by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison.59
The citizen is protected from unconstitutional action of govern-
ment officials in the United States by thejudicial development of the
exclusionary rule as the main protection for criminal process rights
and also by Congressional enactment of enforcement legislation, 60
most notably the various civil rights acts. In Canada, the constitu-
tion provides such remedies in section 24 (which can be invoked
concurrently with section 52):
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appro-
priate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court con-
cludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or de-
nied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence
shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the cir-
cumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration ofjustice into disrepute.61
Subsections (1) and (2) are interdependent and must be read
together with sections 1 (reasonable limits), 32 (state action) and 52.
Only those rights and freedoms in the constitution are enforced by
section 24 remedies. The courts presently are considering many
preliminary problems. The standing of a party recently has been
widened by the Canadian Supreme Court in a number of non-Char-
ter cases. 62 The problems of defining the forum, or "court of com-
petent jurisdiction," and of determining the burden on each party at
various stages also have resulted in much litigation, especially at the
trial court level.
Canada has provided the nature and general structure, broad
though they may be, for judicially imposed remedies. One Ameri-
can commentator has noted that the specificity in delineating rights,
freedoms and remedies in the Canadian constitution relative to the
American Constitution will make textual analysis of prime impor-
tance. 63 The implicit delegation of rights control to the judiciary
Constitution Act, 1982, § 52(l)-(2). See Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, 9
D.L.R.4th 161 (Can. 1984).
59 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
60 Enforcement legislation is authorized by sections 2 of the thirteenth and fifteenth
amendments and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
61 Constitution Act, 1982, § 24.
62 Compare Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962) with Minister ofJustice v. Bo-
rowski, 130 D.L.R.3d 588 (Can. 1981) and Nova Scotia Bd. of Censors v. McNeil, 55
D.L.R.3d 632 (Can. 1975) and Thorson v. Atty.-Gen. of Canada (No. 2), 43 D.L.R.3d 1
(Can. 1974). See I W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, § 9.1-.2.
63 Sedler, supra note 7, at 1228.
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has ramifications for the entire legal system. Because most of the
rights and freedoms are related to criminal procedure, excluding
reliable evidence of a crime to protect rights and control police mal-
practice will bring into tension the contrasting requirements of a
criminal justice system: that the innocent go free, that the guilty be
convicted, and that there are enforceable restrictions on arbitrary or
wrongful police powers.
II. EVIDENTIARY REMEDIES-THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
There are an assortment of exclusionary rules in both Canada
and the United States. The regulation of allowable evidence at trial
has two objectives. 64 First, and most important, is the objective of
promoting truth through reliability. Thus, there are exclusionary
rules prohibiting hearsay, opinions, bad character and secondary ev-
idence, which might otherwise be unreliable, prejudicial or mislead-
ing evidence.
Second, there are inhibitive rules such as privileges concerning
marital and attorney-client communications. These rules have a
public policy objective of protecting privacy interests and social re-
lationships regarded as sufficiently important to justify sacrifice of
reliable and relevant evidence. Along with these inhibitive rules are
what McCormick calls "Constitutional Privileges," 65 which in the
United States are those against self-incrimination, 66 confessions 67
and illegally obtained evidence.68
In England, the general rule always has been that illegally or
improperly obtained evidence is admissible although the judiciary
may exclude evidence on the ground that operation of the strict rule
of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused.69 This
limited exclusionary discretion based on unfairness to the accused
was most recently confirmed by the House of Lords in R. v. Sang.70
The House of Lords said that a trial judge always could refuse ad-
64 See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2175 (J.
McNaughton rev. 1961); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
65 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
66 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69 See Dawson, The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative Study, 31
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 513, 534-37 (1982); Federal/Provincial Task Force on the Uniform
Rules of Evidence (Canada), Report of the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1982).




mission of evidence if in the judge's opinion its prejudicial effect
outweighed its probative value.7' Thejudge has no discretion, how-
ever, to refuse relevant and otherwise admissible evidence on the
ground that it was obtained improperly or by unfair means. 72
Therefore, with respect to real, reliable, physical evidence, supervi-
sion of the police is not a judicial function:
[T]he function of the judge at a criminal trial as respects the ad-
mission of evidence is to ensure that the accused has a fair trial accord-
ing to law. It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary
powers over the police or prosecution as respects the way in which
evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them. If it was obtained
illegally there will be a remedy in civil law; if it was obtained legally but
in breach of the rules of conduct for the police, this is a matter for the
appropriate disciplinary authority to deal with. What the judge at the
trial is concerned with is not how the evidence sought to be adduced
by the prosecution has been obtained, but with how it is used by the
prosecution at the trial. 73
The Scottish and Irish courts have used judicial exclusion of
evidence as a policy to denounce police wrongdoing.74 The Scottish
inclusionary discretion has been stated as follows: "[E]vidence ille-
gally or irregularly obtained is inadmissible unless the illegality or
irregularity associated with its procurement can be excused by the
court."
75
Neither Australia nor New Zealand has an automatic exclusion-
ary rule, but the judiciary has broader discretion to exclude illegally
or unfairly obtained evidence than in England.76 Although the aim
of England's discretion appears to be unfairness to the accused, re-
cent Australian cases have viewed that as only one factor and incor-
porated broader public policy considerations, balancing disapproval
of unlawful conduct with the objective of convicting the guilty. 7 7
71 Id at 434, 437 (Lord Diplock), 438 (Viscount Dilhorne).
72 Id. at 436 (Lord Diplock). Nevertheless, the judge could exclude admissions, con-
fessions and evidence obtained from the accused after the commission of the offense.
73 Id. at 436 (Lord Diplock).
74 Federal/Provincial Task Force on the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Canada), supra
note 69, at 225, 229. The principal Scottish case is Lawrie v. Muir, 1950J.C. 19 (Scot.
H.CJ. 1949). See Dawson, supra note 69, at 537-38; Yeo, Inclusionary Discretion Over Un-
fairly Obtained Evidence, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 392 (1982).
75 Sheriff MacPhail, "Law of Evidence in Scotland" (April 1979, para. 21.01), cited by
Lord Scarman in Sang, 1980 A.C. at 457.
76 Federal/Provincial Task Force on the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Canada), supra
note 69, at 227-29. See Dawson, supra note 69, at 538-43; Yeo, supra note 74.
77 Bunning v. Cross, 19 Austl. L.R. 641 (Austl. 1978) (plurality opinion); The Queen
v. Ireland, 126 C.L.R. 321 (Austl. 1970); Federal/Provincial Task Force on the Uniform
Rules of Evidence (Canada), supra note 69.
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B. DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA
Both Canadian and English courts previously have focused on
illegally or improperly obtained evidence. This usage may be due to
the absence of textual constitutional rights because in the United
States the courts have concentrated solely on illegally obtained evi-
dence. Evidence which is obtained by a party through violation of a
constitution, a statute, or a rule of common law is illegally obtained.
Although not unlawfully obtained, evidence obtained by way of un-
fair or unethical trick may be classified as improperly procured
evidence.
It is doubtful that the conjunction of these two terms is still ac-
curate in Canada. Section 24 certainly incorporates the concept of
illegally obtained evidence because that is an obvious factor in de-
termining if a constitutional right or freedom has been "infringed or
denied." Improperly obtained evidence, however, is not necessarily
relevant to section 24 unless the particular impropriety is seen as a
consideration in determining the infringement or denial of a right.
In order to appreciate their separate effects, the mixed concepts of
illegality and impropriety in pre-1982 decisions will have to be reex-
amined and the terms distinguished.
Before the 1982 constitution, Canada had no legislated rule of
evidence concerning illegally or improperly obtained evidence. The
judicially developed law was that such evidence was admissible if it
was relevant, although the courts had limited discretion to exclude
evidence when "the strict rules of admissibility would operate un-
fairly against the accused." 78 The unfairness test was that the preju-
dicial effect outweighed its probative value, not an examination of
the manner in which the evidence was obtained.
I am not aware of any judicial authority in this country or in Eng-
land which supports the proposition that a trial Judge has a discretion
to exclude admissible evidence because, in his opinion, its admission
would be calculated to bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute.... [T]he exercise of a discretion by the trial judge arises only if
the admission of the evidence would operate unfairly. The allowance
of admissible evidence relevant to the issue before the Court and of
substantial probative value may operate unfortunately for the accused,
but not unfairly. It is only the allowance of evidence gravely prejudi-
cial to the accused, the admissibility of which is tenuous, and whose
probative force in relation to the main issue before the court is trifling,
which can be said to operate unfairly. 79
78 The Queen v. Wray, 11 D.L.R.3d 673, 685 (Can. 1970). The words are used in
Sang, 1980 A.C. 425, 434 (H.L. 1979) (Lord Diplock) and come from Kuruma v. The
Queen, 1955 A.C. 197, 204 (P.C.).
79 Wray, 11 D.L.R.3d at 685, 689-90 (Can. 1970).
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The issue in Canada, as in the United Kingdom in Sang, was
whether excluding unlawfully obtained evidence would avoid unfair-
ness to the accused at his trial. This notion of a fair trial derives
from a background of affording greater protection to the individual
in order to counterbalance the greater resources of the state.
As late as 1981, the Canadian Federal/Provincial Task Force on
Evidence, after a four year ongoing study of rules of evidence, rec-
ommended that no provision be enacted in a draft Uniform Law of
Evidence to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence.80
This recommendation was later approved by the Uniform Law Con-
ference of Canada, which recommended integrating the rule of Wray
into the proposed Act.8 '
The Proposed Constitutional Resolution of October 1980 in-
cluded two remedial sections, neither of which contemplated exclu-
sion as a constitutional remedy:
25. Any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of this Char-
ter is, to the extent of such inconsistency, inoperative and of no force
or effect.
26. No provision of this Charter, other than section 13 [which
dealt with self-incrimination], affects the laws respecting the admissi-
bility of evidence in any proceedings or the authority of Parliament or
a legislature to make laws in relation thereto.8 2
The document presented by the Special Joint Committee in
1981 incorporated section 25 into the present section 52(1), deleted
section 26 and added the present section 24. The minority views of
discretion found in Wray became constitutionalized.
Since the enactment of section 24, there has been an avalanche
of cases that attempt to determine the extent and scope of the Char-
ter "rights and freedoms" and what amounts to a denial or infringe-
ment. The steps in an application for exclusion of evidence under
section 24 are (1) determining whether a right or freedom under the
Charter has been infringed or denied, which includes a considera-
tion of sections 1 and 33, and then (2) determining whether the ad-
mission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute. An affirmative answer to the last issue makes exclu-
sion mandatory.83 Because the exclusion of evidence in subsection
(2) is restricted to "proceedings under subsection (1)" together with
the additional requirements, accused persons have attempted to ap-
80 Federal/Provincial Task Force on the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Canada), supra
note 69, at 225.
81 Id. at 514.
82 See supra note 49.
83 See R. v. Bryant, 15 D.L.R.4th 66 (Ont. Ct. App. 1984); R. v. Simmons, 7
D.L.R.4th 719 (Ont. Ct. App. 1984).
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ply under subsection (1) itself for an exclusionary remedy.8 4 In that
case, the Court could exclude the evidence without considering the
matter of disrepute or "all the circumstances." There are other pre-
liminary issues that must be resolved before determining whether
evidence should be excluded as well as questions of derivative evi-
dence, causation and the burden of proving a likelihood.
The major issue, however, is what brings the administration of
justice into disrepute. This somewhat ambiguous phrase was first
used legislatively in Canada in the 1976 enactment of section
178.16(2) of the Criminal Code, 5 which allows a judge to hold de-
rivative evidence from wiretapping inadmissible. It also received ju-
dicial comment from two dissents in the Canadian Supreme Court
by judges obviously anticipating the constitution. In Rothman v. The
Queen,86 the court held that a confession made by the accused to a
disguised policeman placed in his cell was admissible. Justice Es-
tey's dissent examined the propriety of the police activity and stated
that what would bring the administration of justice into disrepute
was what "would prejudice the public interest in the integrity of the
judicial process." 8 7 Justice Lamer, in a separate opinion concurring
with the result, elaborated on the integrity of the judicial process as
a factor in admitting evidence and suggested some standards:
The Judge, in determining whether under the circumstances the
use of the statement in the proceedings would bring the administra-
tion ofjustice into disrepute, should consider all of the circumstances
of the proceedings, the manner in which the statement was obtained,
the degree to which there was a breach of social values, the seriousness
of the charge, the effect the exclusion would have on the result of the
proceedings. It must also be borne in mind that the investigation of
crime and the detection of criminals is not a game to be governed by
the Marquess of Queensbury rules. The authorities, in dealing with
shrewd and often sophisticated criminals, must sometimes of necessity
resort to tricks or other forms of deceit and should not through the
rule be hampered in their work. What should be repressed vigorously
is conduct on their part that shocks the community. That a police of-
ficer pretend to be a lock-up chaplain and hear a suspect's confession
is conduct that shocks the community; so is pretending to be the duty
legal aid lawyer eliciting in that way incriminating statements from sus-
pects or accused; injecting pentothal into a diabetic suspect pretend-
ing it is his daily shot of insulin and using his statement in evidence
would also shock the community; but generally speaking, pretending
to be a hard drug addict to break a drug ring would not shock the
community; nor would, as in this case, pretending to be a truck driver
84 R. v. Therens, 18 D.L.R.4th 655 (Can. 1985).
85 CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 178.16(2) (1976).
86 12 D.L.R.3d 578 (Can. 1981).
87 Id. at 599 (Estey, J., dissenting).
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to secure the conviction of a trafficker; in fact, what would shock the
community would be preventing the police from resorting to such a
trick.88
This shock to the community test echoes the due process inter-
pretation of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 89 and the contrasting processes of constitutional interpretation
in the two cases illustrate the problem of distinguishing right from
remedy. In Rochin, the shocking conduct of obtaining swallowed ev-
idence (pills) by administering an emetic was considered by the
Court to determine whether the right to due process under the four-
teenth amendment was breached. In Rothman, however, the court
examined the conduct to determine whether it brought the adminis-
tration of justice into disrepute and thus should result in excluded
evidence. Although Rothman is a pre-Charter of Rights judgment, it
did propose persuasive criteria for consideration under section
24(2). These criteria might be more useful, however, when deter-
mining whether or not a right was infringed or denied in the first
place. The Rothman test has been questioned by at least one provin-
cial appellate court, which commented that it is better to consider
each case on its merits rather than to substitute such a community
shock test.90 The administration ofjustice may be brought into dis-
repute without necessarily shocking the Canadian community as a
whole.
All judges of the Supreme Court of Canada save one declined
to expatiate the meaning of the expression "bring the administra-
tion of justice into disrepute" when that issue first came before the
court.9 1 Only Justice LeDain, who dissented in the result, consid-
ered the test or standard prescribed by section 24(2).92 He wrote
that the "central concern" of the section is "the maintenance of re-
spect for and confidence in the administration of justice."9 3 The
other value which must be taken into consideration, Justice LeDain
opined, is "the availability of otherwise admissible evidence for the
ascertainment of truth in the judicial process." 9 4 Justice LeDain
stated that the two principal factors to consider were the relative
seriousness of the constitutional violation and the "relative serious-
88 Id. at 621-22 (LamerJ., concurring).
89 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
90 Simmons, 7 D.L.R.4th at 744 (Ont. Ct. App. 1984). See the provincial appellate
court decisions cited in Therens, 18 D.L.R.4th at 684-85.
91 Therens, 18 D.L.R.4th 655.
92 Id. at 683-88 (LeDainJ., dissenting).




ness of the criminal charge." 95 Factors which affect the seriousness
of the constitutional violation include the good faith of the violator,
inadvertence or deliberateness, urgency and the need "to prevent
the loss or destruction of evidence." 96
The criteria which a court should consider has been raised re-
cently in several different contexts.97 Until there is greater predict-
ability, the judiciary will have to consider a number of factors.
If the violator acts willfully or deliberately, the violation is more
serious than if it was an inadvertent error. This consideration, how-
ever, puts a premium on the ignorance of the officer. The good
faith test is better because it focuses on the intent of the violator.
Therefore, for policy reason, the courts should also consider
whether the officer's ignorance was inexcusable. Urgency also is a
factor which incorporates the intent or knowledge of the violator.
Using this factor may lead to dilution of the guarantees, if it be-
comes a justification when there is no other way to get evidence for
a conviction.
The nature and extent of the violation's illegality addresses the
constitutional importance of the right. The denial of a right itself
may not be the only consideration as denials in different circum-
stances may have drastically different consequences. Courts should
weigh the extent to which human dignity and social values were
breached in obtaining the evidence, whether harm was inflicted on
the accused or others and the seriousness of any breach of law in
obtaining the evidence. This last factor and the seriousness of the
charge both involve considering the proportionality of the remedy
to the constitutional violation. The judge should be aware of the
consequences for society of freeing, because of the excluded evi-
dence, the particular individual before the court. On the other
hand, fairness to the accused is presumably still within the parame-
ters of the common law discretion available to the judge.
The reliability of the evidence is the underlying concern of
most criticisms of the American rule. One commentator states that
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 CANADIAN COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS, REPORT (1969); COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, SECOND
REPORT, VOLUME 2, FREEDOM AND SECURITY UNDER THE LAW 1046-53 (1981); LAW RE-
FORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, EXCLUSION OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1974);
LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT ON EVIDENCE (1977). See also R. v. Ste-
vens, 1 D.L.R.4th 465 (N.S. Ct. App. 1983); R. v. Collins, 148 D.L.R.3d 40 (B.C. Ct.
App. 1983); R. v. Esau, 147 D.L.R.3d 561 (Man. Ct. App. 1983).
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this concern should operate only "in favour of the accused." 98 For
instance, if there is some cruel and unusual treatment which may
produce evidence with dubious credibility or accuracy, the judge
should exclude the suspect evidence. On the other hand, if a mur-
der weapon is found after a rights violation, the reliability of such
evidence would favor admission.
C. DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Until the Canadian 1982 Constitution, the development of ex-
clusionary sanctions to protect or enforce federal constitutional
rights was unique to American jurisprudence. The United States
Constitution does not expressly provide a remedy to someone
whose constitutionally given rights are violated, but if evidence is
obtained in violation thereof the general rule has developed that it
is automatically inadmissible. 99
The American courts have developed essentially five constitu-
tional exclusionary rules. There are rules governing investigative
evidence concerning identification procedures and lineups (fifth and
sixth amendments)' 00 and searches and seizures (fourth amend-
ment). 1° 1 Trial rights of due process (fifth amendment), self-
incrimination (fifth amendment)' 0 2 and right to counsel (sixth
amendment)' 03 also are exclusionary remedies. All of these reme-
dies have differences in scope, exceptions and some have become
violation-specific. The due process guarantee is based on a concern
with unreliability and inappropriate procedure which are so directly
linked with the right that the right itself embodies the exclusion.
The right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel have
both caused exclusion of voluntary confessions.' 0 4 The source of
the most controversy, however, has been the exclusion of evidence
because of the search and seizure rule.
98 Gibson, Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in THE CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 523 (W. Tarnopolsky & G.-A. Beaudoin eds. 1982).
99 The common law rule at the time of the Constitution and for some years thereafter
was that illegally obtained evidence was admissible. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 64,
§ 2183.
100 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, § 7.1-.5.
101 Id., §§ 3.1-.10, 9.1-.6.
102 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note
16, §§ 3.1, 6.5-.10.
103 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); 1 W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, § 6.4.
104 See 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, §§ 6.1-3; 3J. WIGMORE §§ 821-63 (J.
Chadbourn rev. 1970 Supp. 1985); 8J. WIGMORE, supra 64, § 2266. Due process can be




In large measure, the debate over the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule revolves around two fundamental issues: first, that the
evidence is usually physically real, reliable and not a product of the
constitutional violation and, second, the extent and nature of police
abuse in obtaining evidence by unreasonable searches. The first
may result in convincing evidence of crime and the second theory
lacks conclusive support, therefore the debate continues. The de-
velopment of the judicially imposed exclusionary rule for fourth
amendment violations began almost parenthetically in Boyd v. United
States.'0 5 The Court stated that "admission in evidence" of an in-
voice found in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments was an
"unconstitutional proceeding."' 106 Although this dictum was virtu-
ally repudiated in Adams v. New York, 10 7 it was revived and imposed
on the federal courts by Weeks v. United States.'08
The rule was expanded by a number of cases, including
Silverthorne,109 GouledI10 and Agnello, I I' and by 1925, the exclusion-
ary rule was completely annexed to the fourth amendment. The
next stage was the coupling of that amendment to the fourteenth
amendment so that the exclusionary rule applied to the states. In
Wolf v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held that fourth amendment
rights were enforceable against the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment but found that there were a
number of ways to enforce the search and seizure right, none of
which were characterized as constitutionally required. 1 2 This was
the first Supreme Court examination of whether to exclude evidence
as a matter of remedies separate from a right secured by the fourth
amendment. 1 3 The Court refused to impose the exclusionary rule
on states when there were other equally effective state remedies in
place. 1 4 In Mapp v. Ohio,1 15 however, the exclusionary rule was
constitutionally required: "[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
105 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
106 Id. at 638.
107 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
108 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
109 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
110 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
II' Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
112 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
113 See Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Developnent and Fu-
ture of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLtM. L. REv. 1365, 1378
(1983).
114 Wolf, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"15 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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inadmissible in a state court," 1 16 although the largely unstated
source for this statement has raised much of the present argument
over the rule.' 1
7
An insight into the decisionmaking of Mapp and the evolution
of the exclusionary rule is given by former Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart. Although the decision overruled Wolf, Justice Stew-
art points out that the parties' briefs and arguments did not even
raise that issue.1 1 8 In fact, when the appellant's counsel was asked
by the Court, he answered that he had never heard of the Wolf
case.
1 19
As for the constitutional underpinnings of the exclusionary
rule, "no decision by the Court has ever fully explored the possible
alternative doctrinal bases for the rule, and the justifications for the
rule seem to have changed subtly over time-usually without any
explicit recognition by the Justices involved."' 120
The cases recognized by the courts as seminal should be limited
to their facts. 12 1 Boyd was a civil, not criminal, case and did not in-
volve the police. There was no search or seizure as that is presently
defined 12 2 and the exclusionary rule was not declared necessary to
remedy a fourth amendment violation. Instead, the rule was neces-
sary to prevent violation of the fifth amendment, which specifically
excludes testimony and is designed to protect rights at trial. The
Court therefore produced the rule as a byproduct of the fifth
amendment ban on compulsory testimony. Adams was a criminal
case and the issue was characterized as evidentiary, not constitu-
tional. Consequently, the evidence was admitted regardless of how
it was obtained. Weeks involved illegally seized property which was
wrongly not returned before trial and can be distinguished from a
search for fruits or evidence of a crime.' 23
Stewart notes that the present law of the search and seizure ex-
clusionary rule is "as complex a delineation of rules, exceptions and
refinements as exists in any field ofjurisprudence."' 124 Discovering
its history becomes "an analysis of almost a hundred years of case
116 Id at 655 (effectively overruling Wolf, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and applying Meeks, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) to the states).
117 See Stewart, supra note 113, at 1380.
118 Ido at 1366-68.
119 Idt at 1367.
120 Id. at 1372.
121 See id. at 1372-77.
122 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
123 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
124 Stewart, supra note 113, at 1365.
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law in this country and literally hundreds of years of history.' ' 25
The reason for this quagmire is that the doctrine itself has been af-
fected by the necessity of distinguishing incidental factors. One
confusing question is whether the exclusionary rule is a constitu-
tional principle' 26 or a court adopted rule of evidence. 27 Another
difficulty is whether the Supreme Court has exerted its jurisdiction
as a result of supervisory powers 128 or as admissibility prohibited by
the United States Constitution. 129 To disentangle these various ele-
ments and yet keep them in sight is not always an easy task for the
judiciary.
Lately, the courts have narrowed the exclusionary rule. In Al-
derman v. United States,'30 which one commentator claims marks the
"point of diminishing returns"' 31 of the deterrent function of the
exclusionary rule, the Court first suggested that the decision
whether to apply the rule turns on a balancing of the costs and ben-
efits of exclusion.' 32 The Court in United States v. Calandra seemed
to settle the question of the rationale of the exclusionary rule by
deciding that it is a constitutional remedy based on deterrence. 33
The Calandra decision defined the balancing test as the potential in-
jury to the proper functioning of the proceeding as opposed to the
incremental deterrence effect. 134
The good faith exception, which often had been suggested as a
limitation to the rule's availability, 13 has been partly accepted by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon. 136 In Leon, the majority
held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be
modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief
of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ulti-
mately found to be unsupported by probable cause."'' 7 Thus, the
125 Id.
126 Implied by Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
127 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
128 For a discussion of whether the Supreme Court has its jurisdiction as a result of
supervisory powers, see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1962).
129 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
130 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
131 Note, The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in California, 24 STAN. L. REV. 947, 958 (1972).
132 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75.
133 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 354 (1974). See also United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
134 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488-89 (1975).
135 See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 n.l 1 (1984).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 3409, 3417.
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majority accepted that the exclusionary rule is "a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect," the applicability of which "must be re-
solved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use" in
evidence of illegally seized evidence. 138 The Court in Leon decided
that good faith by the constitutional violator nullifies the use of the
exclusionary rule, based on the deterrent rationale. Extensions of
the exclusionary rule doctrine into areas such as derivative evidence
(fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine) also have resulted in excep-
tions to the rule such as cases of attenuated circumstances, an in-
dependent source or an inevitable discovery.13 9
There are three theories that attempt to explain that the exclu-
sionary rule is constitutionally required, although the distinctions
between them are not always clear. 140 First, the exclusionary rule is
required to preserve the integrity of government and the judicial
process. Courts have a duty to refrain from sanctioning illegal law
enforcement, otherwise they will breed contempt for law and the
judiciary. This doctrine finds it roots in Weeks, 14 1 is probably most
emphasized in Silverthorne,142 and was repeated in Elkins,143 Mapp,144
Terry 145 and Dunaway. 146 This theory, however, no longer seems to
have significant independent effect. 147 The problem with it is that
there is no textual support in the Constitution 148 and that the courts
historically have admitted illegally obtained evidence. Stewart con-
cludes that because a value judgment is the source for this theory
there is no justification in making the exclusionary rule
mandatory. 149
A second theory is that exclusion is mandated directly by the
Constitution, that there is a constitutional right to the exclusion and
138 Id. at 3412 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
139 See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See generally I W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, § 9.3-.5.
140 See Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57
WASH. L. REv. 647, 647-51 (1982); Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith
Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 879-80 (1982); Stew-
art, supra note 113, at 1380-84.
141 232 U.S. at 391-94.
142 251 U.S. at 392; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
14" 364 U.S. 206.
144 367 U.S. at 648, 651-59.
145 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
146 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979).
147 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23; Stewart, supra note 113, at 1396.
148 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
149 Stewart, supra note 113, at 1383.
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admitting the evidence would nullify that right. Thus, the fourth or
fifth amendment, separately or taken together absolutely forbid the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence. This theory has support
in Weeks 150 and Mapp.151 In Gouled, exclusion of evidence is called
"a constitutional right"'' 52 and the dissenting justices in Leon reiter-
ated this theory. Again, there is no textual support in the Constitu-
tion for an explicit right to have unconstitutionally acquired
evidence excluded.
More compelling is the theory that exclusion is a constitution-
ally required remedy. The Constitution creates rights and duties and
it is the judiciary's primary responsibility to enforce them.153 This
theory postulates that the need to enforce the Constitution's limits
and to preserve the rule of law requires the exclusionary rule. Ex-
clusion is not a right but a remedy developed by "constitutional
common law."' 154 The necessity of using exclusion as a remedy then
depends on whether there are other effective remedies to ensure
obedience to the constitutional requirement. Support for this doc-
trine is found in Wolf, 155 Mapp,156 Calandra,15 7 Bivens 158 and Leon. 159
Exclusion has been chosen as a remedy because of its deterrence
value. This reliance upon deterrence as the rule's sole rationale is
probably the most significant development in recent years. The
function has been described as "to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it."160
While Leon has been the most recent comprehensive Supreme
Court reexamination of the purposes of the exclusionary rule, 16 1 it
appears that the debate is not over. Leon involved drugs found by
police officers, objectively acting in good faith on a search warrant
subsequently found to be invalid because it lacked the required
probable cause. The Court reviewed the purposes of the fourth
150 232 U.S. at 126 (the constitutional right was not to have the evidence excluded but
returned).
151 367 U.S. at 657; id. at 662 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Ker, 374 U.S. at 30.
152 Gouled, 225 U.S. at 313 (the exclusionary rule is a constitutional right in the con-
text of the fifth amendment).
153 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
154 Stewart, supra note 113, at 1384.
155 338 U.S. at 31; but see id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
156 367 U.S. at 652.
157 414 U.S. at 348.
158 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the F.B.I., 403 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1971)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
159 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
160 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217; see also Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
161 Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405.
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amendment exclusionary rule to determine the propriety of its ap-
plication to a case where the constitutional transgressors were act-
ing in "good faith." 162 Justice White, for the Court, recognized at
the outset that strict application of the rule has created a dilemma
for courts by impeding the truth-finding function of the judge and
jury.163 The Court held that the rule was not a corollary of the
fourth amendment, t 6 but that the judiciary had to employ a balanc-
ing test. "[Plarticularly when law enforcement officers have acted in
objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the
magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants of-
fends basic concepts of the criminal justice system."' 65 The Court
asserted that the exclusionary rule "cannot be expected, and should
not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement ac-
tivity.' 1 66 The exclusionary rule is "designed to deter police mis-
conduct rather than to punish the errors of judges"' 167 and is
therefore generally inappropriate in most due process arguments.
Its applicability, the Court asserted, "must be resolved by weighing
the costs and benefits of preventing the use [in evidence] of inher-
ently trustworthy tangible [but illegally seized] evidence."' 68
Leon was applied by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard,169 which involved evidence of a murder (the victim's bloodied
clothing and possessions) found as a result of a search warrant
which was defective in its particulars. The objectively reasonable
reliance by the officers on the warrant, which they believed to be
valid (and were told by the authorizing judge that it was valid) made
the exclusionary rule inappropriate. 70
The Supreme Court was divided, however, in both Leon and
Sheppard. Justices Brennan and Marshall lamented "the Court's
gradual [since Calandra] but determined strangulation of the
rule.... It now appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth
Amendment is complete."' 7 1 These Justices declared that the ma-
jority "ignore[d] the fundamental constitutional importance of what
is at stake here."'172 They objected strongly to construing the rule
162 Id. at 3416-23.
163 Id. at 3413.
164 Id. at 3412.
165 Id. at 3413.
166 Id. at 3419.
167 Id. at 3418.
168 Id. at 3412.
169 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
170 Id. at 3429.
171 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430 (BrennanJ., dissenting).
172 Id. at 3430-31.
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as a judicially created remedy that was operational due to its deter-
rent effect and categorically stated that it is a "personal right to ex-
clude all evidence secured by means of unreasonable searches and
seizures."' 73 From Calandra to Leon, it is clear that the deterrence
rationale has blossomed as the paramount focus of the debate, to
the exclusion of other considerations.
Judge Posner has examined the exclusionary rule from a differ-
ent perspective, but arrived at basically the same conclusion. Using
economic analysis, he finds that "[t]he common law remedies for
governiental misconduct in criminal cases are best explained by as-
suming that judges are preeminently concerned with economic effi-
ciency, even though the underlying norms defining that misconduct
are often not economic."' 174 Nevertheless, he agrees that the eco-
nomic and historical explanations are consistent: "[T]he rule was
adopted because until recently there was no alternative sanction for
violations of the fourth amendment that did not cause severe un-
derdeterrence."' 75 Posner claims that his economic analysis ex-
plains the rule and that he is supported by the Court's refusal to bar
or exclude prosecution on the basis of an illegal arrest. 176 Although
a literal application of the exclusionary rule would lead to the con-
clusion that the arrestee could not be prosecuted, such barring of
prosecution would cause overdeterrence of an even more costly sort
than the evidence exclusionary rule and is not applied on that eco-
nomic basis.
D. CRITICISM AND SUPPORT
Legal commentators and legislators have vigorously debated
the justification for the exclusionary rule, especially as it results
from the fourth amendment, and the issue has divided the Supreme
Court of the United States. In the touchstone of American evidence
treatises, Wigmore explains his opposition to the development of
the "magnetic" effect of the "relatively modern federal doctrine ex-
cluding evidence seized in violation of search and seizure laws": As
a general rule, our legal system does not attempt to do justice inci-
dentally and to enforce penalties by indirect means. A judge does
not attempt, in the course of specific litigation, to investigate and
punish all offences which incidentally cross the path of that
173 Id. at 3433.
174 Posner, Excessive Sanctions For Govenimental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L.
REV. 635, 636 (1982).
175 Id. at 638.




Wigmore's unrestrained and acrid caricature of the rule as "in-
direct and unnatural" follows:
'Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius,
you have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer
imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall
let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do
so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of teaching people
like Flavius to behave, of teaching people like Titus to behave, and
incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of up-
holding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but
to let off somebody else who broke something else.'
Some day, no doubt, we shall emerge from this quaint method of
enforcing the law. At present, we see it in many quarters. It will be
abandoned only as the judiciary rises into a more appropriate concep-
tion of its powers and a less mechanical idea ofjustice.1 78
Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was offensive to Wig-
more for four reasons: (1) it ignores the proper complaint, investi-
gation process and trial of an alleged violation of law; (2) as an
incidental violation it jeopardizes (by delay, confusion, etc.) the pri-
mary litigation; (3) it is unnecessary because persons harmed have
more direct means of redress; and (4) "[t]he judicial rules of evi-
dence were never meant to be used as an indirect method of
punishment."1 79
Wigmore's basic criticisms often have been modified. The rule
discriminates because it benefits only the guilty; the issue arises
solely when the evidence is incriminating. The exclusionary rule is
not proportionate because it does not distinguish the minor viola-
tions from major ones. In most search and seizure cases the real
evidence is not created by the official wrong, as may be the case in
an extorted confession, and therefore the rule ignores reliability. Its
federal development is also criticized because although the exclu-
sionary rule was conceived originally for the federal system, its sche-
matic application to the states does not give sufficient regard to the
different types of crime in the two systems, especially the prevalence
of violence in state crimes. Lastly, the rule is not remedial because
the return or suppression of evidence is not a remedy in the strict
sense of a constitutional wrong. The critics' reaction is summed up
by Justice Cardozo: "The criminal is to go free because the consta-
177 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, at § 2183.
178 Id. § 2184a n.1.
179 Id. § 2183.
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ble has blundered." 180
Posner argues that the exclusionary rule ought to be aban-
doned because it overdeters and produces a deadweight loss that
violates the Pareto-superiority criterion of economic analysis.' 8 '
The exclusionary rule does not satisfy this criterion because it
suppresses socially valuable evidence, a situation which is avoided if
the misbehaving government official is fined instead. The
overdeterrence objection is based on the possibility of the private
and social cost imposed on the government greatly exceeding the
social cost of the misconduct.
The underlying norms defining government misconduct in
criminal cases are, however, not merely economic. For instance,
when considering characteristics of due process, a conviction based
on a coerced confession is unjust even if the defendant is clearly
guilty. Posner asserts that the objection to an unreasonable search
and seizure is not that it renders unfair the criminal proceeding
which uses its fruits, but that it invades collateral interests in prop-
erty and tranquility. ' 82 These interests, he states, are fully protected
by tort remedies. 18 3 To Posner, the pivotal considerations are relia-
bility of the evidence and fairness in the process. 8 4
Professor Kamisar has noted that the present judicial view of
the exclusionary rule, deterrence weighed in a cost-benefit analysis,
results in a balancing of competing and different kinds of interests,
such as suppression of crime against the rights of privacy and lib-
erty.' 85 Although the costs are immediately apparent, the rule's
benefits are only conjectural and the reliance on balancing the two
demands has resulted in problematic extensions. For instance, ille-
gally obtained evidence is admissible in civil proceedings and can be
used to attack the defendant's credibility if he testifies. 186
These criticisms, then, are that the rule is internally inconsistent
and lacks benefits, that it preserves rights only by imposing some-
180 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1926) (rejects the application
of the exclusionary rule to a state case).
181 See Posner, supra note 174, at 638. The Pareto theory of equilibrium holds that an
optimum is a state in which no person can benefit without a corresponding detriment to
another person.
182 Id. at 643.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Kamisar, Court's 'Good-Faith' Exception, New York Times,July 11, 1984, at A25, col.
1.
186 See Janis, 438 U.S. 433 (1976); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); but see
Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionay Rule: Deregulating the
Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 399-401 (1981).
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times dreadfully high costs on society and that the benefit to the
defendant is disproportionate to the violation.
Many commentators have replied that criticisms of the exclu-
sionary rule are "nonsense"1 87 and are really criticisms of the right
for which protection is sought. Although this may be true, if it is
constitutionally required, the right and rule become one and criti-
cism in many instances may be valid. One criticism of the rule is
that it restricts police investigation or lacks clarity in standards.
This is indeed a criticism of the right behind the remedy and should
be properly addressed to it. Posner asserts that "the Fourth
Amendment was not intended to give criminals a right to conceal
evidence of their crimes" and that it only protects lawful interest.1 18
In fact, the English cases inspiring the fourth amendment were not
criminal cases but tort cases seeking damages for invasion of lawful
interests. General warrants to search were despised in Britain and
had prompted the leading case of Entick v. Carrington,18 9 a successful
trespass action for damages. Similar writs of assistance were used in
America to enforce the British mercantile system and when Inde-
pendence came, the Entick case was remembered by the drafters of
the fourth amendment.190
Writs of Assistance were authorized in Canada until December,
1985.191 The Writ, unlike a search warrant,19 2 was granted only for
searches related to drugs and customs.19 3 It was valid for as long as
the person to whom it was granted remained an officer and could be
used repeatedly without subsequent court applications. One pro-
vincial appellate court had held searches authorized by such writs to
be constitutionally invalid and of no force or effect. Even though
the search was in contravention of section 8, section 24(2) was the
basis for not excluding the evidence.1 94
The support for the exclusionary rule generally can be catego-
rized into three themes. The first is its effectiveness: other remedies
(criminal, administrative or civil) have failed to secure compliance
by the police with constitutional provisions. The second is its insu-
187 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 137.
188 Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 49, 53 (1981).
189 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1762).
190 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-27. See Brent, Illegally Obtained Evidence: An Historical and
Comparative Analysis, 48 SASK. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1983-84).
191 CAN STAT. ch. 19, §§ 190, 191, 196, 200 (1985).
192 Criminal Code, supra note 85, § 443.
193 See Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-40, § 145 (1970); Excise Act, CAN. REV.
STAT. ch. E-12, § 78 (1970); Food and Drugs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. F-27, § 37(3)
(1970); Narcotics Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. N-1, § 10(3) (1970).
194 R. v. Noble, 14 D.L.R.4th 216 (Ont. Ct. App. 1984).
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lation: condonation or participation in illegality taints the court's
dignity as the agent and custodian of liberty. The third is its public
relations value: admissibility of illegally obtained evidence breeds
public contempt for the law.
The exclusionary rule is designed to remove the police's incen-
tive to violate the law by barring the use of illegally obtained evi-
dence. Nevertheless, the present reliance on deterrence as the
rule's rationale has resulted in an attack on its effectiveness as a de-
terrent and the assertion that the exclusionary rule results in the
growth of serious crime. The latter idea has been dismissed as "fan-
tasy or deception" by one commentator.1 95 Although there have
been a large number of American empirical studies to test the use-
fulness of the exclusionary rule, the findings are inconclusive. 196
Since Mapp it has been virtually impossible to gather data on
the relative effectiveness of alternative measures in deterring fourth
amendment violations. "The actual research task is factually hope-
less," decried one commentator. 197 Defining the method of evalua-
tion and the criteria of success entails choosing which circumstantial
and indirect measures should be documented to yield a valid infer-
ence about pre- and post-rule illegal searches. The design for a
study has to be quantitative, a formidable problem because non-
events (not conducting a search) have to be quantified. The hope
that the fourth amendment can be enforced "by exclusion of relia-
ble evidence from criminal trials was hardly more than a wistful
dream," concluded the Chief Justice in his dissent in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents.' 98 Given the inconclusiveness of results,
195 Schlag, supra note 140, at 891.
196 See Morris, supra note 140, at 652-56; Posner, supra note 187, at 54-58; Project,
Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 781-82 (1979). The major studies in-
clude: COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF THE Ex-
CLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (1979); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFOR-
NIA (1982); Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea
Against Precipitous Conclusions, 62 KY. LJ. 681 (1973-74); Nagel, Testing the Effects of Exclud-
ing Illegally Seized Evidence, Wis. L. REV. 283 (1965); Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclu-
sionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 A.B.F. RES. J. 585; Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Sevilla, The Exclusion-
ary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839 (1974); Spiotto, Search and Seizure:
An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973);
Effect of Mapp v. Ohio On Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM.J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 87 (1968); Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclu-
sionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and U.S. v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740
(1974).
197 Morris, supra note 140, at 656.
198 403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Burger's suggestion of placing the burden of positive
evidence on the rule's proponents is inappropriate.
Canadian and English empirical data, to the extent that they ex-
ist, have not received any general publicity. In Canada it is prema-
ture to attempt to draw conclusions about the effect of the new
provisions, especially considering that there are very few supreme
court decisions giving substantive interpretations and therefore di-
rection to police authorities. 199 Nevertheless, the Canadian circum-
stances provide a unique opportunity for comparison of pre- and
post-1982 practices, or even to note changes in police behavior as
the supreme court provides definitions of the rights.
The deterrent rationale also relies on the premise that a convic-
tion is important to the police. Police, however, may seek arrest and
clearance of the crime as their goal rather than conviction of the
suspect. Discretion within the system often allows police to deal
with the case later without it ever being subjected to an open and
public hearing. It is unknown how often the type of charge laid or
the use of negotiated pleas of guilty to less serious offenses is attrib-
utable to either the police or the prosecutor acknowledging the pos-
sibility of excludable evidence.
One benefit of the American exclusionary rule is that it pro-
vides a venue-the suppression hearing-for discovery and allows
close scrutiny of police practices in individual cases. 200 The ac-
cused's complaint can be made public and the judiciary forced to
compare police behavior with legal standards. This process often
affects the substantive law of the right involved and has been the
impetus for the great expansion of rights analysis in the United
States. In practice, however, many violations are hidden by discre-
tionary plea bargaining and never reach open court.
There are many remedies and enforcement mechanisms pro-
vided for important legislated rights, such as contract, housing and
employment, which are beyond the Constitution's reach. The judi-
cial isolation of the exclusionary rule in the United States, unlike the
textual test of Canada's section 24, raises the question why the law
treats various substantive fields differently. By enacting section 24,
Canada seems to have accepted the judicial integrity theory for the
exlusionary rule. In contrast, that rationale is no longer emphasized
in the United States. Although it has not specifically been over-
199 See generally Stuart, Annotation to R. v. Collins, 33 C.R.3d 130, 134 (B.C. Ct. App.
1983).
200 Dawson, supra note 69, at 530.
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ruled, it has certainly been overshadowed by the deterrence
rationale.
In the United States, criticism of the exclusionary rule often has
been a reaction to its use in trials of serious crimes, for example, the
case in which the body of a murder victim was held inadmissible as
evidence against the suspect because of some official misbehav-
ior.20 1 In Canada, there has been little excitement about the rule,
mostly because there has been limited activity in serious or
outrageous cases involving either an offended society or an offen-
sive crime.
To some degree the public concern about excluding real, relia-
ble evidence may reflect the influence of modern technology. For
example, the entire world was able to watch on television the shoot-
ing of President Reagan and the capture of his assailant. If for any
reason the evidence seen by the public eventually was excluded at
trial, a person could rightfully ask how realistic the system is in de-
termining guilt. The legal artificialities, or fictions, may be undergo-
ing major revision in the context of the modern world.
Argument in the United States over limitations to the rule is
based on the premise that it is an absolute remedy and leaves the
real limitations to the definition of the preconditioning rights. Sec-
tion 24 in Canada allows the suggested American limitations to be
considered as factors for the test of bringing the administration of
justice into disrepute. Suggestions that the exclusionary rule not
apply to serious cases, therefore, have met objection on the grounds
that that would allow police to ignore the fourth amendment.202 It
is this distinction between right and remedy, explicit in the frame-
work of Canada's section 24, which will make the exclusion consid-
erations there focus on their own merits. In Canada it is not open to
the courts to exclude evidence in order to discipline police, but only
to avoid having the administration of justice brought into disre-
pute.203 The test is not one of discretion but of meeting standards
as a matter of law. The presence of section 24(2) will no doubt save
Canada the American codevelopment of exclusionary rules in differ-
ent areas with different considerations. Instead, all cases will ana-
201 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (evidence of murder victim excluded as
fruit of defendant's deprivation of right to assistance of counsel), sub nom. on remand, Nix
v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (evidence of same body not excluded on ultimate or
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule). See also Killough v. United States,
315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
202 1 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 140-41.
203 Collins, 148 D.L.R.3d at 49.
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lyze criteria which may or may not bring the administration of
justice into disrepute and be internally comparable.
III. OTHER REMEDIES
Under English common law, liberties have been protected to a
great degree within the political system by public opinion, media
pressure and the influence of Members of Parliament. In the judi-
cial sphere, protection has been through tort (trespass against a per-
sonal or property right even if unaccompanied by actual damage),
the right to a jury in common law actions and serious criminal accu-
sations, the principle that all persons are equally subject to the juris-
diction of the court (subject to standing and sovereign immunity
questions) and the rule of construction that statutes be interpreted
not to interfere with vested rights. A person is entitled to unim-
peded access to the courts for enabling the enforcement of civil
rights through these traditional means.20 4
In the Canadian Constitution, section 24(1) gives explicit au-
thority to the court to grant "such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances. '" 20 5 That section does
not seem to create any remedies, but does acknowledge that all the
traditional ones are available. The remedy of section 24 must be
granted by a "court of competent jurisdiction" and, although this
phrase is still the subject of some controversy, the weight of author-
ity is that section 24 does not create courts of competent jurisdiction
but merely vests additional powers in courts which are already com-
petent and independent of the Charter.20 6
One quasi-judicial remedy involves administrative or internal
disciplinary proceedings. In Bivens, Chief Justice Burger suggested
that the exclusionary rule be replaced by a statutory remedy entail-
ing a special tribunal with damages jurisdiction. 20 7 Numerous at-
tempts and proposals have been made to create nonpolice or
internal police review tribunals to hear evidence, award damages
and make remedial orders (usually of a disciplinary nature) but po-
litically this idea apparently is dead. 208 The lack of public scrutiny
204 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 29; see also United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. REs. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR at 73, Art. 8 (1948); European Convention for Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 3.
205 Constitution Act, 1982, § 24(1).
206 See R. v. Crate, I D.L.R.4th 149 (Alta. Ct. App. 1983); Re Ritter and the Queen, 7
D.L.R.4th 623 (B.C. Ct. App. 1984); R. v. Morgentaler, 14 D.L.R.4th 184, 190 (Ont. Ct.
App. 1984).
207 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 422-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
208 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975);
Dawson, supra note 69, at 530-32; see also Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforce-
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and securing of police cooperation which are needed for such a sys-
tem to work create problems with this type of system. The model
does recognize a deterrent factor often overlooked in discussions of
the exclusionary rule: police behavior is largely in compliance with
internal norms and officers will accept as legitimate only internal
disciplinary sanctions.
There is an array of other creative procedural and related reme-
dies which might be appropriate, especially considering the inex-
plicit nature of section 24(1). For instance, Canadian courts have
reduced sentences as a remedy, 20 9 or given a right of appeal where
none existed before.210
In England, it is uncertain and contentious whether there is
general judicial discretion to stay a criminal prosecution when it has
been held an abuse of process. 211 In Canada, such a residual discre-
tion has been only recently confirmed. 212 Interestingly, the tests de-
veloped in both countries are concerned with the abuse of the
process of the court. The remedies all have the same result and prob-
ably are not different in law. 213 They are discretionary and based on
the inherent jurisdiction of a court to control its own process. It
may be that in Canada there is room to extend the doctrine to abuse
of the constitution, or argue that such abuse is of the court process.
These remedies usually do not apply to police investigative pro-
cedures, but instead to the judicial proceedings. If there is such
abuse the court may grant acquittal orjudicial stay as a remedy. The
defendant may see no practical difference but the distinction in-
volves the function of the judge: as judge of cases presented to the
court or as decisionmaker over what cases are permitted to come
before the court.
Another issue is the type of abuse which must be present. The
usual characterization is an "oppressive" or "oppressive or vexa-
tious" prosecution. 2 14 An alternative remedy in most cases might
be a provision for awarding costs. Since this doctrine indeed exists
now in Canada, it is superfluous to adopt it as a special constitu-
tional remedy. "It would be preferable to continue to develop ordi-
ment Agencies, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500 (197 1); Note, Grievance Response Mechanisms
for Police Misconduct, 55 VA. L. REV. 909 (1969).
209 R. v. Johnson, 21 M.V.R. 28 (Alta. Prov. Ct. 1982); R. v. Sybrandy, 9 W.C.B. 329
(Ont. Prov. Ct. 1983).
210 See R. v. Lee, 69 C.C.C.2d 190 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1982).
211 D.P.P. v. Humphrys, [1976] 2 All. Eng. Rep. 497 (H.L. 1976).
212 R. v. Jewitt, 20 D.L.R. 4th 651, 658-59 (Can. 1985).
213 The remedies are dismissal, quashing the indictment or judicial stay of
proceedings.
214 SeeJewitt, 20 D.L.R.4th at 667-68; Amato, 140 D.L.R.3d 405, 435, 444-45.
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nary criminal law concepts, such as 'abuse of process,' and to save
the constitution for cases where it is actually needed, such as to
strike down legislation. '21 5
A. COMPENSATION
Actions for damages arising from a breach of rights can be
traced at least to 1703 when the English House of Lords decided
that damages were an appropriate remedy for violation of the right
to vote, even though the actual damage suffered was difficult to
prove.216 ChiefJustice Holt stated that there was a deterrent aspect:
"To allow this action will make publick [sic] officers more careful to
observe the constitution of cities and boroughs." 2 17 Now, in the
United States "common law torts embrace invasions of every sort of
interest that might reasonably be thought protected by the Fourth
Amendment. ' 218 Judge Posner asserts that violation of any such
lawful interest can be redressed by torts such as conversion, false
arrest and imprisonment, trespass to land and chattels, assault, bat-
tery, infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.219
Judge Posner's premise is that the interest a criminal has in avoiding
punishment for his crime is not protected by the fourth amendment,
and therefore, tort and the exclusionary rule are alternative reme-
dies rather than additive ones. 220 As a result, a criminal should not
be compensated for punishment for a crime of which he was guilty
because that is not a lawful interest.
Goals of the tort system include deterrence, affirmation of the
plaintiff's right, punishment and compensation. There are also
problems, however, with the tort remedy. The individual litigant is
forced to bring a constitutional tort action independent of any gov-
ernment and this creates difficult economic22' and psychological de-
cisions. Compensation depends solely on the defendant's
resources. Furthermore, there are the questions about which gov-
ernmental bodies can be effectively joined as defendants and what
are the limitations of sovereign immunity. There is some belief that
215 Jewitt, 20 D.L.R.4th at 659.
216 Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (1703).
217 Id at 137.
218 Posner, supra note 188, at 53 n.15; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (a
constitutional violation by a government agent gives rise to a cause of action even in the
absence of a statutory right).
219 Posner, supra note 188, at 53.
220 Id. at 49-50.
221 Counsel fees may be allowed, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985),
although this has recently been limited by Webb v. Bd. of Education of Dyer County,
105 S. Ct. 1923 (1985).
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juries are more likely to believe the law enforcement official than the
plaintiff and, together with the defense of acting in reasonable good
faith, 222 this limits the viability of tort remedies. One commentator
has questioned the ability of tort remedies to effectively protect con-
stitutional rights. 223
A more recent observer, however, believes that an effective tort
remedy has been unavailable only because sovereign and official im-
munity doctrines sometimes have been a barrier and also because
courts have been unimaginative in valuing intangible losses; he con-
cludes that recent developments in tort law have overcome these
problems. 224 Nevertheless, there remains a major difficulty, that of
illegal treatment by police of particular groups in the population.
This behavior may produce large damages when aggregated over a
large number of persons, yet be too small to give any one person an
incentive to sue. One possible solution is to set a minimum liqui-
dated damage figure to which any plaintiff is entitled.
The tort remedy has advantages that the exclusionary remedy
does not offer. 225 Tort compensates the innocent victim as well as
those accused of a criminal offense. There is an element of propor-
tionality which varies the damages with the constitutional violation.
Also, because the tort sanction is directed at the individual violator,
there is a specific deterrence not present with the exclusionary rule.
Because the tort action results in a direct transfer payment,
there is no deadweight loss in the economic analysis model and
damages can be calibrated to yield a desired level of deterrence. 226
From an economic analysis, the tort approach solves the overdeter-
rence of the exclusionary rule, but leaves a residual overdeterrence
problem in the imbalance of compensation to the police. "[Z]ealous
police officers bear the full social costs of their mistakes through the
tort system but do not receive the full social benefits of their suc-
cesses through the compensation system." 227 This problem could
be solved by immunizing the officer, but not the agency employing
him, for misconduct committed in good faith. The agency then has
an incentive to prevent misconduct by its officers.
There is one area where Posner concedes the tort remedy will
not work and that the exclusionary rule is optimal despite its inher-
222 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
223 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493
(1955).
224 Posner, supra note 174, at 638-39.
225 Stewart, supra note 113, at 1387.
226 Posner, supra note 174, at 639-40.
227 Id. at 640.
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ent overdeterrence-the coerced confession or involuntary guilty
plea. If there is an unreliable coerced confession and the other evi-
dence is insufficient to convict, then the appropriate damages are
the costs of punishment unlike in search and seizure cases where the
evidence is reliable. It is consequently cheaper and more efficacious
to use exclusion in the criminal trial as the remedy. If the confes-
sion is coerced but reliable, however, then the exclusionary rule
overdeters. Therefore, argues Posner, the fifth amendment should
be limited by the factor of reliability and the tort remedy limited to
the defendant's lawful interests.
Posner's analysis has been criticized on the grounds that such
economic analysis is not applicable to the exclusionary rule and that
it does not appreciate the exclusionary rule's "empirical reality." 228
Professor Morris argues that Posner uses "overdeters" in the eco-
nomic sense of private cost (and social cost) imposed on the govern-
ment greatly exceeding the social cost of the misconduct, but fails to
identify any underlying justifications behind his policy.2 2 9 He claims
that economic efficiency is not the justification because there is no
reason we should adopt that as a social policy.2 3 0 Morris dismisses
Posner's analysis as hypothetical, arbitrary and of doubtful utility.
In the United States, traditional tort remedies for damages are
available in state courts. Also, tort as a federal remedy against state
officials was created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Civil action for deprivation of rights-
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Co-
lumbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof of the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the pur-
poses of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.2 3 '
Congress passed section 1983, originally section I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,232 in response to reports of lawlessness in the
south directed at blacks and at those whites who assisted them. This
228 Morris, supra note 140, at 663-67. Morris asserts that the Paretian superiority used
by Posner has a critical concept of individual preference rankings and that this is an
important distinction from total-utility theories.
229 Id. at 661.
230 Id. at 661, 667.
231 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
232 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 2.2, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 ("Ku Klux Klan Act"), founded on
federal power under U.S. CONST. amend XIV, s. 5.
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statute allows a complainant to use the federal court system in place
of the state system and provided an alternative to inadequate state
law. 233 A related type of action against conspiracies of private citi-
zens who frustrate the exercise of constitutional rights and liberties
is 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3). Although section 1983 is not available
against federal officials, a Bivens-type action, in which the plaintiff
can sue federal officials directly in tort under the fourth amendment,
can be instituted.
Cases under section 1983 have tested almost every conceivable
relationship between government and the citizen, although the em-
phasis has been on racial, ethnic and sexual discrimination. 234 The
section creates a private right of action to redress violations of con-
stitutional rights committed by persons acting under color of state
law. Therefore, the distinction between state and private action is
important235 as is the difference between the establishment of a
cause of action and the appropriateness of the remedy. 236 There
has been a dramatic increase in section 1983 actions since the early
1970's, 237 especially for discrimination in education, use of public
facilities and accommodation. In the criminal rights area, subject
matter for suits has ranged from unlawful shootings,238 assault,23 9
failure to take reasonable measures to protect personal safety (espe-
cially in racial disorders), and denial of equal protection of the
law, 240 although failure to advise of a right to counsel and silence
has been held not to create a basis. 241
Acts of public officials, including law enforcement officers, per-
formed in good faith and in the exercise of powers conferred on
them by the state generally do not afford a basis for an action.242
This reasonable good faith defense generally has been considered a
major limitation on section 1983, although a research study found it
233 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
234 The commentary on section 1983 is exhaustive. See, e.g., Whitman, Constitutional
Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of
Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969).
235 See T. EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION CASES AND MATERIALS 68-74 (1981 &
Supp. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIruTIONAL LAw §§ 18.1-18.7 (1978 & Supp.
1979).
236 Whitman, supra note 234.
237 Project, supra note 196, at 781-82.
238 Glover v. City of New York, 401 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
239 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
240 Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Il. 1967); see also Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d
33 (6th Cir. 1973).
241 Boulware v. Battaglia, 344 F. Supp. 889 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d
Cir. 1973).
242 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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to be of limited significance and overstated as a theoretical detri-
ment to civil actions.243 Also, legislative, judicial and prosecutorial
immunities limit the scope of applicability; proof of specific intent,
however, is not required.244
Although section 1983 provides a concurrent action to an ordi-
nary state court suit, there are several reasons for a plaintiff to
choose the federal court.245 Federal judges are often more familiar
with claims involving civil rights and less sensitive to local political
pressures. Also, discovery rules in federal courts are usually more
liberal and in many areas, federal court dockets are shorter than
those in state courts.
In Carey v. Piphus, the Supreme Court examined how to deter-
mine damages under section 1983 for a constitutional breach and
suggested that the elements of damages will vary with the constitu-
tional right at issue.246 The Court held that the right to procedural
due process is absolute and even if there are no compensatory ele-
ments, that the courts should award nominal damages, and could
award punitive damages, to deter or punish violations. 247
Section 1983 actions, however, have potential drawbacks. A
Yale field project concluded that juries-critical decisionmakers in
section 1983 suits-are not impartial because many jurors disfavor
plaintiffs and favor police defendants, 248 but the study may not have
fully appreciated the subtlety of this juror reaction. 249 It may be
that the importance in the public view, as represented by the jury, of
the litigated rights in a specific set of circumstances was not as great
as the researchers supposed. Juries not only determine liability but
they set standards. The absence ofjuries in deciding the applicabil-
ity of the exclusionary rule in criminal procedure to evidence is an
important contrast to the civil litigation scheme. A jury is able to
bring contemporary social factors into the legal framework. There
is little doubt that a plaintiff needs clean hands to recover reason-
able damages and this factor often is not present if the plaintiff was
involved in illegal activity. Thus the moral aspects of the case are a
factor, especially when a jury is involved.
The study also discovered that adverse verdicts have a minimal
243 Project, supra note 196, at 803-04.
244 Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
245 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 183; Project, supra note 196, at 782 n.4.
246 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978) (case involved students who were
suspended without procedural due process).
247 Id. at 266-67.
248 Project, supra note 196.
249 Id. at 800. The incidents cited as "bias" seem to be juror reactions based on con-
siderations of police duties, supervision, etc.
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effect on defendants because police departments are insulated from
the consequences. 250 The rare liability of government bodies, which
are liable only when their policies violate the Constitution, 25 1 and the
absence of punitive damages against them252 weakens the deterrent
value. Professor Whitman also concludes that the sporadic suits do
not allow tort to be an effective deterrent because they place a seri-
ous burden on individual plaintiffs and do not address underlying
problems. 253 In comparing damages with injunctive relief, Whitman
suggests that courts should award damages only where necessary to
serve a final purpose of punishment. 254 A court award made against
an individual who appears responsible, coupled with the question
about who actually pays the damages, may not promote general con-
duct which avoids future violations.
One commentator suggested that a tort action would be more
attractive and useful as a significant remedy if the courts imposed
liquidated or inflated penalties. 255 These penalties also might serve
to weight the importance of the right and circumstances involved in
the violation. In addition, governmental liability would provide fi-
nancial responsibility and a deterrent at the level where police pol-
icy is made. Professor Foote is optimistic about the potential
significance of tort especially because it is one remedy where the
"initiative for enforcement [is] in the hands of injured persons who
are offered a selfish motive for prosecuting the actions .... 256 On
the other hand, large and frequent damage actions may cause the
government to be too cautious and may discourage conscientious
persons from accepting government positions.
The courts in Canada always have had the power to award ex-
emplary and punitive damages in addition to the strictly compensa-
tory type. 2 5 7 Now section 24(1) provides a framework in which to
seek compensation alone or together with other remedies. 258 Pre-
sumably a plaintiff can invoke section 24 by itself in an ordinary tort
250 Id. at 810-12.
251 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
252 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
253 Whitman, supra note 234, at 70.
254 Id. at 42, 48-52.
255 Foote, supra note 223.
256 Id. at 516.
257 See Rookes v. Bamard, [1964] 2 W.L.R. 269, 328 (H.L.); Gibson, supra note 98. As
to damages in Canada, see generally S. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES (1983).
258 See Manning, Constitutional and Statutory Created Torts and Liability for Breach thereof, in
LAw Soc'Y OF UPPER CANADA, TORTS IN THE 80's (1983); Weiler, The Control of Police Ae'est




action or in a criminal action where the court is competent to pro-
vide damages, although the applicant takes a risk if all damage
claims are not asserted in one action.259
B. EQUITABLE RELIEF
Since the judicial development of the prerogative writs of habeas
corpus and mandamus, the courts have used the equitable remedies of
declaratory and injunctive relief to protect civil liberties. For in-
stance, the traditional method of enforcing fourteenth amendment
rights is by way of mandatory and prohibitive injunctive relief.2 60 In
the United States, applicants have received broad relief against gov-
ernment officials involving questions of racial desegregation, voting
reapportionment, and, more recently, hospital and prison adminis-
tration.261 In Brown v. Board of Education,262 the Court took unto it-
self the responsibility for dealing with a vast social problem by
desegregating schools, an action which affected millions of school
children. Such administrative injunctions have created a broad area
of institutional reform litigation and the scope of the judicial re-
sponse, either to order reform or to order the particular institution
closed until it meets judicially interpreted constitutional standards,
has created controversy.263
Equitable relief, like damages, is available to applicants in fed-
eral courts for state violations under section 1983.264 In the crimi-
nal process, courts have used injunctive relief to protect against self-
incrimination 265 and to ensure the right to counsel,266 but injunc-
tions have been unavailable when constitutional rights have not
been infringed or where the traditional requirements of injunctions
have been lacking. 267 The courts also have used injunctive actions
to expunge arrest records when an arrest violates the fourth amend-
ment, although they have disagreed on the appropriate remedy.268
259 See Cahoon v. Franks, 63 D.L.R.2d 274 (Can. 1967) (damages resulting from a
single wrong must be assessed in one proceeding).
260 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION
(1978); 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS (1972).
261 See T. EISENBERG, supra note 235, at 378-89.
262 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
263 See Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV.
428 (1977).
264 See also Doran v. Salem Inn Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S.
802 (1974); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a(a) and 1997c (1983 & Supp. 1984).
265 Chandler v. Garrison, 286 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. La. 1968).
266 Bramlett v. Peterson, 307 F. Supp. 1311 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
267 Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
268 Compare Wilson v. Webster, 467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1972) (available for mass
arrest of demonstrators) with Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (not
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In Rizzo v. Goode, the plaintiff sought equitable intervention for a
pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment of a minority
group of citizens by police officers and a remedial injunction was
originally granted. 269 The district court's injunction significantly re-
organized the internal procedures of the Philadelphia police depart-
ment by ordering police administrators to revise manuals so that
police powers were made clear to officers, and also to upgrade the
internal disciplinary system. 270 The United States Supreme Court
reversed that decision, stating that in federal cases of equity, the
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy and
where the administration played no affirmative part in the viola-
tions, equitable relief was inappropriate.271 Also, "principles of fed-
eralism" did not permit federal district courts to inject themselves
"by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of this
state agency ... ."272 The Court conceded that such relief could be
granted in "the most extraordinary circumstances." 273
Judicial control over the internal affairs of municipal police and
prosecutors has been curtailed by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit. 274 In a class action, the petitioners
alleged that the Chicago police maintained a double file system on
suspects and that during discovery proceedings only the central file
information, and not the unofficial street file contents, were trans-
mitted. The court held that it could not invade the province of pub-
lic officials who had jurisdiction to draft policies and internal
guidelines and it restricted a preliminary injunction requiring pro-
duction of the street files.
Courts have developed a complex body of law to determine the
appropriateness of injunctive and declaratory relief.275 The viola-
tion must be clear and the injunction can go only as far as necessary
for protection of the claimed right. Relief is restricted to situations
where neither the exclusionary rule nor money damages are appro-
priate; when there is a threat of imminent harm from continuing
constitutional violations in the way of a clear pattern or stated policy
of continuing police action of the type under complaint. In many
cases a non-monetary award is more appropriate than money dam-
available since no fourth amendment right). The courts usually have balanced the fu-
ture use of the arrest record.
269 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
270 Id. at 369-70.
271 Id. at 378-79.
272 Id. at 380.
273 Id. at 379. See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
274 Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985).
275 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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ages because it changes official behavior, while having fewer disrup-
tive side effects. 276 A major practical limitation of equitable relief is
the necessity of framing a useful yet clear injunction of what is pro-
hibited and what is permitted. One advantage, though, is that a
mandatory injunction directs future conduct rather than apportions
blame for past conduct. It does not, however, punish the wrong-
doer or provide compensation to the individual whose rights were
violated.
In Canada, section 24(1) allows injunctions but contains within
it a possible limitation, the words "have been infringed." 277 The
courts have construed this language to exclude impending infringe-
ments and have limited standing to cases where the applicant's
rights already have been infringed.278 Nevertheless, Professor Gib-
son contends that the drafting history indicates that impending vio-
lations were intended to be included. 279 One of the first Charter
cases to be considered by the Canadian Supreme Court, Hunter v.
Southam'Inc., commenced by way of an application for an injunction
to prohibit a search, although the issues regarding the appropriate-
ness of an injunction for constitutional enforcement were not con-
sidered by the highest court.280
The recent innovation in Canadian courts of a "Mareva injunc-
tion," a pretrial action to prevent the destruction of evidence, 28 1
may help develop the usefulness of this type of remedy. The obsta-
cles in Canada to civil rights injunctions are the historical reluctance
of Canadian courts to make orders requiring continuous detailed
supervision and the Crown's historic immunity from injunctive re-
lief. The latter problem, however, is often alleviated by declaratory
relief, which usually results in changes of official policy to coincide
with the court's direction. Although a declaration may not eliminate
the financial loss, it does affirm the right violated. 28 2
276 Whitman, supra note 234, at 41-42.
277 See generally R. SHARPE, INJUNCTIONS AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (1983).
278 Saumur v. Atty.-Gen. of Quebec (No. 2), 45 D.L.R.2d 627 (Can. 1964) (standing
denied until actually prosecuted).
279 Gibson, supra note 98, at 498-99.
280 Hunter v. Southam, Inc., II D.L.R.4th 641 (Can. 1984).
281 H. HANBURY & R. MAUDSLEY, MODERN Egurry 149-53 (11 th ed. 1981); McAllister,
The Mareva Injunction in Ontario, 2 ADVOC. SOC'YJ. 1-3 (Feb. 1983); Rogers, Civil Proce-
dure-Interlocutory Remedies-Mareva Injunction-Canadian Developments, 61 CAN. B. REV.
882 (1983).





Most behavior that violates the constitution also probably vio-
lates the criminal law.283 In the United States, most crimes come
under state legislative power, but the federal government has also
created two specific criminal constitutional offenses codified as 18
U.S.C. § 241 and § 242:284
Conspiracy against rights of citizens-
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject
to imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 28 5
Deprivation of rights under color of law-
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District or the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such in-
habitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life. 2 8 6
These offenses pertain both to federal and state officials. 287
Even though the duty of keeping the peace and providing crimi-
nal sanction is usually a local and not a federal concern, as late as
1967 the United States Senate acknowledged that "[i]n some places,
however, local officials either have been unable or unwilling to solve
and prosecute crimes of racial violence or to obtain convictions in
such cases-even where the facts seem to warrant. '' 288 The twojus-
283 See generally T. EISENBERG, supra note 235, at 391-422; G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 594-96 (3d ed. 1981).
284 Sections 241 and 242, originating in 1870 and 1866 respectively, were concerned
with the voting rights and emancipation of slaves. Their continuing impetus is racially
motivated violence. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D.
Pa. 1979); aff'd 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685
(4th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
285 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
286 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
287 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
288 S. REP. No. 721, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1837, 1840.
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tifications for continued federal intervention were seen as the often
inadequate and ineffective protection and prosecution on the local
level, and that the racial violence most often was used to deny af-
firmative federal rights and therefore should be remedied by federal
action.
The United States government has used sections 241 and 242
to prosecute violations on the grounds of an arrest without cause or
an arrest based on an illegal, groundless or fictitious warrant. 28 9
The courts have applied these statutes to a murder by law enforce-
ment officials; 290 threatening, maltreating and unlawfully assaulting
a victim lawfully in police custody;291 beating a suspect for the pur-
pose of forcing a confession, whether or not one resulted;292 caus-
ing a dog to bite a suspect;293 and a deputy sheriff subjecting
citizens to indignities because of their membership in a religious
sect, then failing to protect them from group violence. 294 In per-
haps its most notorious use, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the
use of section 241 in prosecuting the illegal break-in of the Water-
gate scandal. 295
The most important interpretation of section 242 is in Screws v.
United States,296 where the Supreme Court emphasized that only a
willful deprivation of a constitutional right may serve as a basis for
such a criminal prosecution. Although this holding is obviously cor-
rect, it may dilute the effectiveness of this remedy. The specific in-
tent requirement of section 241 was examined recently in United
States v. Ehrlichman.297 Section 241 does not require an actual aware-
ness on the part of the conspirators that they are violating constitu-
tional rights; it is enough if they interfere with rights which as a
matter of law are clearly and specifically protected by the Constitu-
tion.298 Acting under the orders of supervisors is not a defense. 299
289 United States v. Ramey, 336 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 972
(1965); Brown v. United States, 204 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1953).
290 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
291 United States v. Stokes, 506 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975).
292 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
293 Miller and Vallee v. United States, 404 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 963 (1969).
294 Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
295 United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Eh-
rlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); United States
v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
296 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
297 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
298 Id.
299 United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1953); United States v. Shafer,
384 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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The vagueness of the two sections in their definition of consti-
tutional rights has been one recurring problem. 300 In 1968, Con-
gress attempted to respond to this complaint by adding section 245,
which more specifically enumerated "federally protected activities"
and made interference with them a crime. 30'
Another major concern in the United States is the source of
Congressional power and its reach, which involves two sub-issues:
immunity and private action. Courts have determined that a state
judge could be convicted30 2 and police officers who gave perjured
evidence could be prosecuted under section 242, although both the
judge and the officers may have been immune under section
1983.303 One circuit even held that the section applied to a public
defender who demanded fees from his indigent defendants by
threatening inadequate legal representation. 30 4 The reach of Con-
gress over private actions turns on the phrase "color of law" in sec-
tion 242 and its power to act under either the thirteenth or
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Price,
has stated that color of law includes a willful participant in joint ac-
tivity with the state or its agents, whether or not the person is a state
official. 30 5 When a deputy sheriff released three men from a Missis-
sippi county jail, intercepted them later on the highway and then
took them to a deserted area where he and fifteen persons assaulted
and murdered them, the Court deemed it joint activity. 30 6 This is-
sue is not a concern in Canada, where the federal government holds
plenary power over criminal law and procedure and can pass legisla-
tion concerning both state and private action.30 7
Canada has not enacted any particular criminal sanction for vio-
lation of the matters included in the Constitution Act, 1982. Yet
section 115(1) of the Criminal Code may allow prosecution for vio-
lations of constitutional rights:
300 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966).
301 Interference with Federally Protected Activities, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 245, 82
Stat. 73 (1968). The federally protected activities include voting, participation in and
enjoyment of government services, employment and education.
302 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
303 Briscoe v. Lahue, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983).
304 United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
305 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
306 Id. at 794-95.
307 In the United States, only a United States Attorney can bring a prosecution under
sections 241 and 242. See United States ex rel. Savage v. Arnold, 403 F. Supp. 172 (E.D.
Pa. 1975). In Canada, there still remains a right of private prosecution although in prac-
tice it is rarely used and the Attorney General has a right to intervene. R. SALHANY,
CANADIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 186-87 (4th ed. 1984).
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115. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, contravenes an
Act of the Parliament of Canada by wilfully doing anything that it for-
bids or by wilfully omitting to do anything that it requires to be done
is, unless some penalty or punishment is expressly provided by law,
guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two
years.3 08
The major issue is whether the Constitution Act, 1982 is "an
Act of Parliament." It was a "Resolution". "adopted" by the Parlia-
ment of Canada and is a schedule to an Act of the United Kingdom
Parliament.30 9 Although prosecutions in Canada of federal criminal
laws are by provincial Attorneys General, 31 0 this particular offense
allows, by subsection 2, prosecutions to be instituted and conducted
by the Government of Canada. Thus, the section is protection from
criticism that provincial governments are not vigilant in their en-
forcement against local police forces.
The primary benefit of criminal prosecution appears to be de-
terrence. In practice, a criminal conviction for a police officer prob-
ably would mean loss of employment. The absence of a specific
criminal offense-the most traditional way of enforcing social policy
for willful violation of the Canadian constitution-casts doubt upon
the government's avowed role in guaranteeing and protecting con-
stitutional rights.
IV. EVALUATING THE REMEDIES
A. SUBSTANCE IN EVALUATION
Although a written constitution does not "partake of the prolix-
ity of a legal code," 31' one of its major goals is the designation of
individual freedoms and liberties, which has important implications
for public standards and for the rule of law. A right is referred to as
a constitutional right in the United States and Canada because it
appears in the written constitution (regardless of its content), while
in Canada before April 17, 1982, a constitutional right could be con-
sidered as the content of a rule, regardless of its form.3 12 Now that
constitutional rights are a fundamental and pivotal aspect of crimi-
nal procedure in both countries, society must recognize the basic
goals of the criminal justice system. These include minimizing erro-
308 CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 115(c) (1970).
309 Canada Act 1982, see supra notes 2 & 49.
310 See supra note 26.
311 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
312 See E. WADE & A. BRADLEY, CONSTTUTIONAL LAw 2-7, 479-582 (8th ed. 1970).
Canada has not abrogated rights recognized before April, 1982. Constitution Act, 1982,
§ 26. See also U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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neous convictions by making fact-finding reliable and accurate, min-
imizing the burdens on the accused and on litigation, convicting the
guilty, retaining respect for the dignity of the individual, maintain-
ing an appearance of fairness, and achieving equality in the applica-
tion of the process.
The exclusionary rule fulfills several functions in this scheme.
In the United States, its basis seems to be a mixture ofjudicial policy
and the rules of evidence, although the judiciary is uncomfortable
with the paradox of using illegally obtained evidence in the legal
process. Therefore, it employs the exclusionary rule as a matter of
ideology because the admissibility of evidence is the court's domain.
Thus, the rule can be seen not as a remedy but as a reaction to an
affront on the Constitution, which results in the court attempting to
control its own process and to retain judicial integrity, not to mani-
fest a governmental or personal interest. From this perspective, the
court should not concern itself with deterrence or damages.
Anxiety over the exclusionary rule, as well as the constitutional
tort, may be due to the belief that the judiciary is inappropriately
extending the Constitution. 313 The controversy over the appropri-
ateness of remedies should not be present to any important extent
in Canada because the federalism factor is not acute. One of the
main criticisms of the exclusionary rule-that it promotes disrespect
for law and order by releasing criminals on technicalities-may sim-
ply be a reaction to the fact that the public is able to see who goes
free and what evidence was withheld. For instance, the nature of the
search and seizure right is now defined in both countries in terms of
privacy. Whether there is a constitutional right to privacy of crimi-
nal activity may underline the aversion to the exclusionary rule and
damages theory.
Certainly there is no lawful interest of privacy solely for the pur-
pose of carrying on illegal activity. Posner has made a frontal attack
on this issue, which appears to be almost ignored by other commen-
tators.3 14 Interpretation of rights often becomes a social reaction to
the remedy. As the right becomes redefined, so must the remedy
and its scope. If society balances individual rights, such as privacy,
against the need for law enforcement, that latter need has to be con-
sidered in the modern light of terrorism, criminal threats to large
segments of the population, commercialized illegal drug brokerage,
and the existence of extremely destructive weapons.
Through all this winds the thread of the symbol of the Constitu-
313 Whitman, supra note 234, at 10.
314 See supra note 188, at 50-53.
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tion, which may be an important factor to the supporters of an abso-
lute reliance on the exclusionary rule. Some commentators seem
preoccupied with the deterrence policy virtually to the exclusion of
competing considerations such as proportionality. Apparently they
feel that the erosion of such a severe penalty will also erode the
rights it depends upon and are greatly concerned about police
powers. 315
The characterization of an appropriate remedy, then, is broader
than ajurisdictional issue. If rights formulation is a reaction to gov-
ernment power and constraints, then remedies should be measured
proportionately. Exclusion of evidence cannot be used against
every exercise of discretion or federal review of state criminal pro-
ceeding. The nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy, which should be framed to correct the condition that of-
fends the Constitution by balancing individual and collective inter-
ests. 3 16 The alternatives to the exclusionary rule achieve some but
not all of the necessary remedial functions. For instance, they are
seldom appropriate to attack frequent violations motivated by zeal
rather than malice.3 17
This conflict of efficiency with normative judgments pervades
the analysis. Perhaps the issue is one of flexibility in the judicial
system. England is inflexible against the exclusionary rule while the
United States employs an inflexible rule of exclusion. Canada's po-
sition is one of compromise, constitutionalizing all existing reme-
dies and providing some framework for choice.
B. FUNCTION IN EVALUATION
Each component in the constitutional rights model has as its
goal the reaffirmation of values by denunciation of illegal acts. Nev-
ertheless, the interests of the government, individual and judiciary
are different. The government wants to ensure that the constitution
is meaningful for all its citizenry. "The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protec-
tion of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection." 31 8 It can do this
by affirming the importance of the constitution by punishing and
315 For example, a New York Times editorial, after dismissing considerations of a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, asserted that police, prosecutors and
judges "should be applied to obeying and enforcing the rule of law, not dancing around
it." Editorial, Let Facts, Not Faith, Guide the Police, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1983, at A26.
316 Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (197 1).
317 See Stewart, supra note 113.
318 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
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deterring violators. Thus, the government's interest is probably
best carried out through criminal prosecution and providing equita-
ble injunctive relief.
The goal of a person who has had a constitutional right violated
is compensation. In Canada, one of the major concerns about en-
trenching individual rights into the constitution was the effect on
the role of the judicial vis-a-vis the legislative branch of government.
Now the function of the American and Canadian courts in constitu-
tional protection is the same-to define the meaning and scope of
constitutional rights and to resolve the questions of constitutional
protection of those rights. This is quite different from the Canadian
judge's traditional role which was to provide a fair trial for the ac-
cused and was confined to the forensic process; the judge controlled
neither the police nor the prosecuting authority. 31 9
The judicial response has been the most active response in
America. Even though the judiciary is constrained by institutional-
ism-being appointed and not democratically representative and
only responsive to those small sets of problems which come before
it-one commentator concluded that judicially enforced constitu-
tional rights have not proved "fatally antidemocratic in nature" but
have "enhanced the democratic quality of American society" by en-
forcing "pro-democratic rights." 320 Thejudiciary's decisionmaking,
however, always has illustrated the tension between pragmatism and
judicial fidelity to the Constitution. "What a judicially enforceable
charter of rights like the United States' Bill of Rights really does is
to give life to a continuous and somewhat cyclical process ofjudicial
development that is guided, but not really constrained by the
text." 32' The courts are affected by economic and social realities,
and developments in technology.
One of the legally imposed restraints on case determination is
the standing of the applicant. Contrary to Canadian practice, in the
United States the party seeking relief must have an adversary inter-
est in the outcome. 322 The Attorney General, in seeking equitable
civil relief, lacks standing to advance the civil rights of third parties
unless there is express statutory power.323
319 See, e.g., Sang, 3 W.L.R. at 288.
320 Bender, The Judicial Protection of Rights in THE U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE CANA-
DIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 108-09 (W. McKercher ed. 1983).
321 Id.
322 Supra note 62. Governments in Canada can refer constitutional questions to the
courts for advisory decisions.
323 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. at 1252. One advantage of the
existence of both an exclusionary rule and statutory relief is that it has overcome the
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The inherent contradiction in judicial lawmaking, that it should
be stable yet responsive to changes in society, is aggravated by con-
stitutionalizing rights in the United States and Canada. In one
sense, the American approach to legislative history and extrajudicial
evidence in constitutional interpretation reduces the impact of that
contradiction. In Canada, the availability of multiple remedies and
the textual tests may allow contemporary input. Generally, at least
in academic and intellectual circles, the judiciary probably is re-
garded in high esteem for making changes that people believe are
desirable.3 24 Judicial interpretation takes on a special acuteness
when a written constitution is involved and the Supreme Court of
Canada, drawing upon its American counterpart, has recognized
this in one of its recent judgments:
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from
that of construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obli-
gations. It is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by
contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide
a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of government
power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the unremit-
ting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its
provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore,
be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social,
political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The
judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting
its provisions, bear these considerations in mind. Professor Paul
Freund expressed this idea aptly when he admonished the American
courts 'not to read the provisions of the constitution like a last will and
testament lest it become one.'
[A] broad, purposive analysis, which interprets specific provisions
of a constitutional document in the light of its larger objects is also
consonant with the classical principles of American constitutional con-
struction enunciated by Chief'Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).325
The criticism that the exclusionary rule places an unreasonable
burden on law enforcement officers to master the intricacies of
rights jurisprudence raises the question of the extent to which the
public perceptions of law and order should be allowed to play a role
in defining the scope and enforcement of constitutional rights. It
may be that the "stage of saturation" has been reached for the "pe-
limitations of a dual court system where the defendant and the availability ofjurisdiction
have to be categorized.
324 "The belief [in the United States] is that the Supreme Court will reach a faster and
more desirable resolution of our problems than the legislative or executive branches of
government." H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (1969).
325 Hunter v. Southan Inc., I 1 D.L.R.4th at 649-50 (emphasis in original).
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riod of misuse" of the exclusionary rule.326 Although there is noth-
ing new about public opinion influencing the development of
law, 327 it often has not been recognized as mass public opinion, but
as elite or effective or influential opinion. Whatever public is relied
upon, it is often transient, both in intensity and time, ill-informed
and, when in group form, open to question as to the representative-
ness of the spokesperson.
In Canada, public opinion can take a legal form in constitu-
tional development through the courts. The availability of private
criminal prosecutions often has allowed pressure groups-as in-
formed watchdogs-to institute actions in cases which have not
moved the government. 328 In the United States, a similar but less
influential role is performed by groups which support certain de-
fendants or act as amicus curiae.
A rare insight into popular opinion is California's 1982 amend-
ment of its state constitution, the "truth-in-evidence" voter initiative
known as Proposition 8, which abolished California's extended ex-
clusionary rule and made all "relevant evidence" admissible except
where it violates the federal Constitution. 329 The courts of that
state have interpreted exclusion as a remedy, not a right.330 "The
people have apparently decided that the exclusion of evidence is not
an acceptable means of implementing [the substantive constitu-
tional rights], except as required by the Constitution of the United
States."3 31 Neither the rights guaranteed nor the remedies allowed
will have much meaning unless they have general popular support.
It is therefore surprising that the jury, relied upon as a constitu-
tional332 and democratic pillar in the criminal justice system, is not
allowed to participate in either country in deciding whether a right
has been violated. That matter is left as an issue for the judiciary
alone. Popular input into legal decisionmaking is difficult to incor-
porate at any stage, but at least is present in limited form when a
jury is involved. Ajury tends not to be theoretical but brings with it
the reality of modern social factors into the legal framework. Ajury
may be the better arbiter of contemporary rights and contemporary
remedies. In criminal cases, the jury has no part in defining the
326 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2184a n.1.
327 A. DICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
19, 20 (2d ed. 1914); T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 127 (5th
ed. 1956).
328 See M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 6, at 67-112.
329 CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
330 People v. Daan, 36 Cr. L. 2188 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1984).
331 People v. Lance W., 36 Cr. L. 2411 (Cal. S. Ct. 1985).
332 U.S. CONST. amends V, VI, VII; Constitution Act, 1982, § 11 (f).
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scope of the alleged violated right, in deciding whether there was a
violation, or in determining the appropriate remedy. Yet, in civil
cases concerning similar rights, the jury is a critical decisionmaking
body not only of the quantum of damages, but the standards re-
quired.3 33 Much of the criticism of civil damage remedies, there-
fore, may be unjustified if that process is viewed as a popular
standard-setting body.
In the United States, judicial deference to legislators is more
often than not the rule.3 34 The enforcement of constitutional rights
has proceeded with both the acquiescence and the active coopera-
tion of Congress, and Congress has not attempted to substantially
limit the court's jurisdiction. For instance, by the time the Supreme
Court enforced the exclusionary rule on the states, a majority of
states already had adopted it for themselves. In the period between
Mapp and Calandra, Congress' ability to modify the exclusionary rule
was doubtful. Because Calandra declared the rule not to be constitu-
tionally mandated, legislative action to modify the rule has been
proposed both in Congress 335 and in the Supreme Court.336
There is no doubt that the exclusionary rule presents a di-
lemma, as both the United States and Canadian Supreme Courts
have recognized 37 In particular, the exclusion of real, reliable,
physical evidence contradicts the truth-seeking function of the crim-
inal trial. On the other hand, unbending application of an exclu-
sionary rule may generate disrespect for law and the administration
of it by the court. The balancing test used in the United States to
determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule338 creates addi-
tional problems. The costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule and
their measurement appear to be elusive. The rule admittedly rests
on social considerations which may be above such measurement.
C. APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES-CANADA COMPARISONS
In the first case under the 1982 Constitution to reach it, the
Canadian Supreme Court drew upon American constitutional inter-
333 See Project, supra note 196.
334 See Bender, supra note 320, at 114-19.
335 In the 99th Congress, S237 (The Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1985) was
introduced and referred to the Judicial Committee on January 22, 1985. In the 98th
Congress, S283 and H4407 attempted to eliminate the rule; SI01, S1764, and H2239
attempted to severely limit the rule, making it inapplicable if there is reasonable good
faith belief that the search and seizure conformed with the fourth amendment.
336 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 423-24 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
500-01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
337 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413; Rothman, 121 D.L.R.3d at 621-23.
338 Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405.
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pretation as an aid.33 9 Ironically, the case itself involved an Ameri-
can applicant/intervenor. 340 The court considered its function in
construing a written constitution: "The courts in the United States
have had almost 200 years' experience at this task and it is of more
than passing interest to those concerned with these new develop-
ments in Canada to study the experience of the United States
courts. ' 34 1 Reference was made to the discussions ofjudicial review
in the American cases of Marbury v. Madison342 and M'Culloch v.
Maryland.343
In the Canadian criminal rights area, American cases frequently
are cited. In its first examination of "unreasonable" in the context
of section 8 search and seizure, 344 the Canadian Supreme Court
drew upon American concepts of the right of privacy against state
intrusion by adopting reasoning from Katz v. United States345 and re-
ferring to United States v. Rabinowitz34 6 in coming to its conclusion.
The court noted, however, the differences in the search and seizure
guarantees of the two countries:
The [section 8] guarantee is vague and open. The American
courts have had the advantage of a number of specific prerequisites
articulated in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, as well as a history of colonial opposition to certain Crown inves-
tigatory practices from which to draw out the nature of the interests
protected by that Amendment and the kinds of conduct it proscribes.
There is none of this in s. 8. There is no specificity in the section
beyond the bare guarantee of freedom from (unreasonable) search
and seizure; nor is there any particular historical, political or philo-
sophic context capable of providing an obvious gloss on the meaning
of the guarantee.347
One appellant courtjustice has reviewed the dissatisfaction with
the American exclusionary rule and concluded, in attempting to in-
terpret what brings the administration ofjustice into disrepute, that:
"The United States experience teaches us that excluding illegally
obtained evidence tends to bring the administration of justice into
339 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, 9 D.L.R.4th 161 (Can. 1984).
340 The issue in the case was whether The Law Society Act of Ontario requiring all
members to be Canadian citizens was inconsistent with § 6(2)(b) of the Constitution Act,
1982. The original applicant, Skapinker (a South African citizen), became a member of
the Law Society during the litigation, and intervenor Richardson (an American citizen
and member of the bar of Massachusetts) was allowed to continue the action.
341 Skapinker, 9 D.L.R.4th at 168.
342 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
343 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
344 Hunter v. Southam Inc., 11 D.L.R..4th 641 (Can. 1984).
345 Id. at 652; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
346 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
347 Hunter v. Southam Inc., 11 D.L.R.4th at 649.
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disrepute, at least where there is not, on the part of the police, a
contempt for constitutional rights. . . Our Canadian experience
does not teach us otherwise."3 48
Although many of Canada's constitutional provisions are simi-
lar to those in the United States, the Supreme Court of Canada has
demonstrated that there are definite differences. 349 For example,
section 23 (concerning language of education rights) is not a codifi-
cation of an essential, pre-existing and more or less universal right.
Therefore, it imposes a unique set of constitutional provisions pecu-
liar to Canada. Here will be a search for history and foundation
perhaps found nowhere else. The Canadian courts will have to rec-
ognize the differences, as well as the similarities, in the two systems.
There is a danger in referring to American exclusionary cases in
the Canadian setting. Most obviously, the law governing illegally
obtained evidence in the United States is diverse and in a state of
major change. Due to the similarity in language used in the Cana-
dian and American constitutions, Canadian courts often may reach
to American decisions for aid in interpretation but they will have to
recognize the differences of history, federalism and the legal and
societal structures. American cases fiave different complexions de-
pending on whether they develop from the damage, injunctive,
criminal or evidence exclusionary context; yet in Canada, each case
can be considered for all of these remedies. Canada, through its
section 24 procedure, has attempted to keep right and remedy anal-
ysis separate and this may limit the use of American judgments
which do not distinguish the two. Perhaps even more important is
the constitutional federalism which has lurked behind every major
American decision but which is not a Canadian issue. For example,
if the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated and an al-
ternative to it is demonstrated as a more effective deterrent, the ex-
clusionary rule may be abandoned and state influence reemerge.
The primary difference in the use of the exclusionary rule is that in
the United States it is viewed as a judicial remedy based on a deter-
rent, controlling supervision over law enforcement; whereas, in
Canada, it appears to be based on a theory of a need for judicial
integrity. Therefore, Canadian courts would do better to look at
those American cases, now hidden behind the reigning theory that
drew upon that rationale.
In the end, American cases, like British judgments, are referred
348 Collins, 148 D.L.R.3d at 52-53 (Seaton, J.).




to by Canadian courts for their persuasive but not authoritative
value. Reliance on them may give Canadian court judgments com-
parative richness, but in the long run can devalue Canada's judicial
independence. As Justice Veit noted in R. v. MacIntyre:
It seems to me in assessing the value of the American precedents,
that from 1961 on in the United States such evidence would be ex-
cluded on the basis of their Constitution, that the Constitution Act, 1982,
is very much the fruit of Canadian political maturity, that this is a tree
which has been grown in our own backyard, not a plastic tree, in my
view, that we bought in a store and put in our yard. It seems to me
that we have to consider the roots from which this tree has grown up
and that involves the Canadian and the Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence
surrounding the words that eventually were chosen to be used in the
Charter.350
[W]hile the result in the United States is a result which we can
examine with interest and while the American experience can perhaps
provide assistance, we should first look to our own Anglo-Canadian
roots for an interpretation of the rights .... 351
Instead, American methods can provide models for Canadian
legal developments. The Canadian courts have not invoked the
remedies which have been examined in this Article to any extent;
the models of evaluating legislative history which the courts have
developed for judicial review in the United States are just being in-
troduced into Canada. Most importantly for Canada, though, are
the American examples of mandatory injunctive relief and the crimi-
nal constitutional offense. Mandatory injunctive relief is the court's
most obvious method of providing general public constitutional
protection, and the enactment of an offense for constitutional viola-
tion is the legislature's best method. Canada, by developing such
methods, although modelled on the American constitutional prac-
tice, can expand and enrich its legal system.
V. CONCLUSION
The recentness of Canada's 1982 constitution and the similarity
of its language to that of the Constitution of the United States
makes comparison of the two inevitable. American and Canadian
constitutional developments have occurred separately and resulted
in different concepts of federalism, court structures, authority over
criminal law and remedies for the violation of constitutional individ-
ual rights. Judicial review of statutory law and governmental action
is a new and awesome concept for many Canadians.
In the United States, reliance has been placed on statutes and
350 139 D.L.R.3d 602, 606 (Alta. Q.B. 1982).
351 Id. at 606-07.
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the judicially developed exclusionary rule for protection of constitu-
tional rights. Canada, on the other hand, has provided explicitly in
the constitution an enforcement provision incorporating exclusion
of evidence, which before 1982 had not been a legislated rule. Al-
ternatives to the exclusionary rule-torts, injunctions and criminal
sanctions-have been used extensively in the United States but are
usually criticized for not having a deterrent function. They do have
the advantage, however, of providing direct and proportional re-
sponses to the constitutional violation. In Canada, these types of
remedies are provided for conjunctively in the constitution.
Canadian reliance upon American jurisprudence, although
tempting, is limited by historic, legal and societal factors. Canada
could accept, however, many methods of constitutional protection
used in the United States, such as mandatory injunctive relief and a
criminal sanction. The extent of those adoptions will depend on the
importance accorded to the constitution and the manner in which
the legislature and courts perceive their roles.
Canadian constitutional law no longer stops at domestic consid-
erations; arguments will now be based partly on American constitu-
tional law. This is an early stage of the constitutional process and it
is of course impossible at the beginning of legal life under the Char-
ter to tell how things will evolve over time. In many ways, Canada's
new constitution will allow reexamination of the judicial role, the
reach of legal remedies and the limits of law itself.
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